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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
"When Adlai E. Stevenson fell dead on a London 
street on July 14, 1965 .there was regret not only in 
America but all over the world •• 
• • That universal 
regret can be understood by looking at Stevenson's life . 
In his sixty-five years he accomplished what few men 
ever do . He graduated from Princeton University and 
Northwestern Univers:l!ty Law School; he was Assistant to 
the Secretary of the Navy ; he was instrumental in helping 
-to write the charter for the United Nations; he served 
as Governor of Illinois for one term, twice ran for 
President of the United States, wrote books and article7, 
traveled extensively, gave lectures, had bi- weekly radio 
and television shows and was named as his nation ' s permanent 
representative to the United ~rations in 1960. He was 
perhaps the most qualified ambassador ever to sit in the 
U. N. since he helped formulate the policies governing 
the U. N. and also because he had visited nearly all of 
the 110 nations ·which compris ed the U . N. He also knew many 
of the world leaders personallyo 
l Richard J . Walton, The Remnants of Power 
(New York: · Coward- Mccann , Inc ., 1968) , p . 13 . 
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Adlai Stevenson did not openly seek the job of U. S. 
Ambassador to the U. N. in 1960, but he graciously accepted 
the task and became a dedicated servant to the cause of 
maintaining peace around the world . In the most grueling 
job of his public career he put in fourteen hours a day 
on what his deputy , Francis Plimp ton, described as "that 
always exacting , often exasperating , sometimes exciting , 
inevitably exhausting and occassionally exhilarating post 
on behalf of the United States . 11 2 
One of Mr. Stevenson ' s biographers , Mr . Bill Severn, 
notes t hat : 
Adlai Stevenson was America ' s Ambassador to the 
nations of the world for 1643 days and few of them 
passed without his forceful voicing of the policies 
set by the government he served . His became the voice 
of democracy t hat challenged communism, the voice of 
freedom , of conscience and honor, a nd that of a man 
who spoke constantly of the search for peace because 
he had a ·working f a i th in the future no matter what 
crisis was upon t he world . 3 
Because Adlai E. Stevenson was a rare br eed among 
men, Secretary of State , Dean Rusk , noted in his eulogy 
tha t "· • • three Presidents of the United States sent Adlai 
Stevenson to the United Nations . They sent you our best . 114 
2Herbert J. Huller , Adlai Stevenson a Study in 
Values (New York : Harper & Row , Publishers, 1967), p . 274 .• 
3Bill Severn, Adlai Stevenson: Citizen of the World 
(New York : David McKay Company, Inc ., 1966), p . 145. 
4Michael H. Prosser , ed . , An Ethic for Survival : 
Adlai Stevenson S eaks on International Affairs 1 6-1 
New York : Hilliam Hor row Co. , 1969 , p . . 7 . 
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Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate a speech 
given by Mr. Stevenss n on October 23, 1962 . This speech 
was one of seventeen speeches given by Mr . Stevenson 
over a period of two years dealing s pecifi cally with the 
Cuban missile crisis . The speech of October 23 , 1962 
was singled out among the seventeen for two distinct 
reasons . First of all, it was noted in An Ethic for 
Survival that this particular speech was " one of his major 
addresses in the United Nations .••• 11 5 Secondly, this 
speech was delivered specifically to the United Nations ' 
Security Council, the only audience in the world whose 
collective decisions on major issues may spell the 
difference between world order and anarchy. 
Significance of the Study 
This study should be of historical, rhetorical, 
and personal significance . 
The study should make a historical contribution 
since very little has been previously published which 
deals specifically wi th Mr . Stevenson ' s U.N. speaking 
career . Furthermore, A. Craig Baird and Lester Thonssen 
note- tha t a ". • • speech cannot be isolated from its social 
5rbid . , p . 342 . 
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milieu . A reconstruction of the ••• background is 
6 
therefore necessary ." Since it will be necessary then 
to delve into the history of the times , this thesis should 
aid others in gaining clearer insights into the Bay of 
Pigs fiasco of 1961 and , more s pecifically, the Cuban 
missile crisis of 1962 . 
This paper should be of rhetorical significance 
becaus e the method of criticism is unique . Here criticism 
goes beyond the traditional concern of identifying the 
uses of rhetorical techniques to an interpret i ve evaluation. 
This method a ttempts to answer a complaint about rhetorical 
criticism set forth by Wr age who says that : 
The interaction between the individual mind of the 
speaker and the collective mind of the audience has 
long been appreciated but for the most part this 
interaction has been consider ed in terms of its 
r elationship to the speaker ' s techniques . 7 
This study is not technique centered . 
We may al so learn s omething about the art of 
r hetoric in a c risis situation . ';!r age says that " a 
speech is an agenc y of its time , one ·whose surviving 
record provides a repository of themes and their elaboration 
from which we may gain insight into the life of an era 
6A. Craig Baird and Lester Thonssen , "Methodology 
in the Criti cism of Public Address," Quarterly Journal 
of Speech, XXXIII (April, 1947) , 137 . 
7Ernes t J . 1.vr age , " Public Address : A Study in Social 
and Intellectual History," ~uarterly Journal of Speech , 
XXX:III (December, 1947), 45 • 
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as well as into the mind of a man. 11 8 Th j s study focuses 
on an officL'1. l s pokesman at a time i n our nation ' s 
history when disaster s eemed imminent . 
Personall y , this thesis should be significant for 
as Wayne N. Thompson states : 
The preparation of the thesis can be a rich 
educati onal experience, 1:..rhich (l) provides t r aining 
in research met hods; (2)requires the integration of 
the knowledge and the skills of several fields • •• 
(3)makes t he student an 'expert ' within a defined 
area; and (4)leads to conclusions regarding the 9 theory and practice of rhetoric in our ovm time . 
Homer Hockett also notes that writing a thesis can 
give one grea t per sonal satisfaction for he notes: 
••• a master's essay may make a r eal even if 
minor contribution to histor ica l knowledge and thus 
become a source of justifiable pride on the part 
of the author . Nore important ••• is the discipline 
which should r es ult from the use of the critical 
me thoct . 10 
This thesis then should be signifi cant in that it 
should give t he wri ter personal s a tisfaction and also 
leave behind a r hetorica l and historical contribution 
for others. 
8I bid . , p. 455 . 
9vfayne N. Thompson, "Con temporary Public Address, " 
Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXXII (October, 1947) , 277 . 
lOHomer Hockett , The Critical Method in Historical 
3esearch and Writing (New York : The MacMillan Co ., 1955') , 
p . 12 . 
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Review of the Literature 
To ascertain the originality of this study several 
indexes in the area of speech resear ch wer e checked . 
Upon examining Dissertation Abstracts it was noted that 
two doctoral papers have been written about Adlai Stevenson ' s 
U. N. s pea"king career . One paper , which the writer found 
most beneficial , was written by Dr . Michael Prosser in 
l 96l1- entitl ed 11 A Hhe tori cal Analysis of the Speechmaking 
of Adl ai E. Stevenson on Major Issues i n the United 
Nations During the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Sessions of 
the General Assembly . 1111 Dr . ? ros ser ' s dissertation 
examined only six· out of the seventeen speeches dealing 
~ith the Cuban missile crises . He examined the ear lier 
Cuban crisis s peeches which ·were given by Mr . Stevenson 
on April 17 , 18 and 20 , 1961, February 5 and 14, 1962 , 
and the speec h of March 1 5, 1962 . 
The second doctoral paper which has been completed 
on Mr . Stevenson ' s U. N. speaking ca reer was written by 
James W. Biggs and it ·was entitled "A Rhetorical 
Analysis of the Speechmaki ng of Adla i i::. Stevenson Inside 
l l Micha el Prosser , "A :thetorical Analysis of the 
Speechmaking of Adlai E. Stev8nson on Ma jor Issues i n 
tho United Nations During the Fifteenth and Sixteenth 
Sessions of the General Ass embl v" (Unuubl i shed Ph. D. 
diss ertation, University of Illinois , ~ 1 964) 
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and Outside the U. N. on Ma jor Is sues During t he Seventeenth, 
Eighteenth and Nineteent h Sessions of the General Assembly . 1112 
Mr . Biggs ' study is primarily concerned with the invention 
used in selected speeches which were given inside and 
outside the U. N. during the seventeenth , eighteenth and 
nineteenth sessions . 
Speech Monographs were also checked to discover what 
master ' s theses have been written about Adlai Stevenson. 
Though a number of papers have been completed or are in 
progress r egar ding Mr . Stevenson ' s oratory , none of them 
deal specifically with his U. N. speaking career during 
the Cuban missile crisis . 13 
A number of speech jour nals were also r eviewed to 
determine potentially benefic ial articles about Mr . 
Stevenson that might be useful . Again it was learned 
that many articles have been published but most of them 
12James W. Biggs, "A Hh etorical Analysis of the 
Speechmaking of Adlai E. Stevenson Inside and Outside 
the U. N. on Major Issues During the Seventeenth , Eighteenth, 
and Nineteenth Sessions of the General Assembly" (Unpublished 
Ph . D. dissertation, Southern Illinois University, 1970) 
13carroll G. Hylton wrot e his thesis on "A Rhetorical 
Criticism of the 1952 Campaign Speaking of Adlai E. 
Stevenson" in 1960 at the University of New Mexico ; Timothy 
H. Changes wrot e on "The Use of Humor i n the Campaign Speeches 
of Adlai E. Stevenson i n 1952 and 1956" at Pennsylvania 
State University in 1963 ; in 1958 Rebecca Porterfield 
completed her thesis at t he University of Ala bama entitled 
"Adlai E. Stevenson ' s Campai gn Speaking in 1952 and 1956. " 
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deal with Mr . Stevenson ' s campaign oratory . 14 One article 
which did prove helnful though was written by Michael 
Prosser and it appeared in Vol . XVI of Central States 
Speech Journal NovembGr 1965 . The article was entitled 
" t~dlai E. Stevenson ' s United Nations Audience ." 
In retrospect then , much has been written about 
Mr . Stevenson ' s rhetoric ; yet mos t art icles , theses and 
dissertations deal with his campaign s peaking or selected 
speeches which Mr . Stevenson made prior to becoming the 
U. S . Ambassador to the U. N. in 1960 . 
Organization of the Study 
Thi s paper is divided into five separate chapter s . 
Chapter I provides an introduction and purpose for the 
study. It also points out the significance of the study, 
reviews the literature , notes the material which proved 
to be most beneficial to this study , gives the criteria 
and method for r hetorical analysis , and provides a 
brief summary in question form of the criteria. 
Chapte r II pr esents a r hetorical biography of Adlai 
E. Stevenson . Attention is focused on his early childhood 
14Raymond Yeager , "Stevenson : The 1956 Campaign," 
Central Sta tes Speech Journal, XII (Autumn, 1960) , 9-1 5. 
Russel Windes Jr ., " Adlai E. Stevenson ' s Speech Staff 
in the 1956 Campaign , " Quarterly Journal of Speech, XLVI 
(February, 1960), 32- 43 . Raymond Yeager , "Presidential 
Campaign 1960 : A Symposium Part I, " Quarterly Journal 
of Speech, XLVI (October , 1960) , p . 239- 245 . 
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in Bloomington, Illinois, his schooling , his speech training, 
his political achievements, and his accompl ishments as 
U. S . Ambassador to the U.N. 
Chapter III discusses the Bay of Pigs incident of 
1961 and further delineates the Cuban missile crisis of 
1962 . Attention centers around the seven addresses which 
Stevenson gave to the U.N . Security Council regarding 
these two Cuban crises . Attention is also given to the 
U. N. audience. 
Chapter IV presents the analysis and the evaluation 
of the speech of October 23, 1962. The analysis and 
evaluation focuses on the discovery of the speaker ' s 
concepts of man , ideas and society. 
Chapter V presents a summary and general conclusions 
which relate to the findings of this study. 
Two ap pendices ~nd a bibliography follow Chapter V. 
Appendix A contains a copy of the speech given by Mr . 
Stevenson to the U. N. Security Council on October 23 , 1962 . 
Appendix B presents letters of inquiry and correspondence . 
The bibliography which concludes this pa per provides a 
listing of selected articles, books and dissertations 
·which were used as references . 
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Materials 
Nwnerous secondary sources were used to complete 
this study. The writer found Mr . Michael Prosser , Assistant 
Professor of speech and theate r at Indiana University, 
most helpful . His dissertation entitled 11A Rhetorical 
Analysis of the Speechmaking of Adlai E. Stevenson on 
Major Issues in the United Nations During the Fifteenth and 
Sjxteenth Sessions of the General Assembly" was quite 
useful as were his nwnerous articles dealing 1·1ith different 
aspects of the U. N. which he has published in various 
speech journals over the last five yea rs . 
Other works which were found to be beneficial wer e 
as follows: An Ethic for Survival : Adlai Stevenson 
Speaks on International Affairs , 1936-1965 edited by 
Mr . Michael Prosser , The Remnents of Power by Richard 
J . Wal ton, Adlai Stevenson: Citizen of the '1.forld by 
Bill Severn, A Prophet in His Own Country and The Politics 
of Honor both by Kenneth S . Davis , and Thirteen Days by 
Robert F. Kennedy . The speech text of October 23, l962 
was acquired from the Department of State Bulletins . Copies 
of Mr . Stevenson' s six other speeches ·which he delivered 
to the Security Council over a period of two years were 
also found in Department of State Bulletins . These six 
speeches provided background information into the Cuban 
crisis . The writer also relied upon numerous periodicals 
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but the two newspapers , The Ne1-.' York Times and The 
Christian Science Honi ter , were most helpful in giving 
the author clearer insights i nto the Cuban crises . 
The Criteria for the Rhetorical Analysis 
In the " Interpretive Function of the Critic" 
Thomas R. Nilsen contends that ':a vital function of 
speech criticism should be to interpret the meaning 
of speeches , not in the sense of clarifying what the 
speaker directly intends but in the sense of what the 
h . d. tl . 1. 11 1 5 speec in irec y imp ies • . • Nilsen suggests that 
the critic should go beyond the obvious, explicit , 
meaning to interpret more implicit , subtle , conceptions 
within the speech . The interpretive critic focuses his 
attention beyond the traditional concern of identifyi ng 
and reporting·the uses of rhetorical techniques . Nils en 
says : 
The rhetorical techniques , the means of persuasion, 
are the speaker ' s response to the rhetorical needs 
of a particular situation , but as such they ar e also 
a r eflection of the speaker ' s concept of man, in what 
he asks him to do ond how; his concept of ideas , in 
what he presents and the manner in which he develops 
it; his concept of society, in what he i~plies about 
the relationship of man to man. 16 
15Thomas R. Nilsen, ed ., Essays on Rhe torical 
Criticism (New York : Random House , 1968 ), p . 87 . 
16Ibid., p . 89 . 
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The Concept of ~an . 
Here the critic ' s function is " to reveal what manner 
f th k . h . 1 • t II 17 o man e spea_er sees in is is eners •••• The 
speaker, according to Nilsen, may never have clearly 
seen or made articulate his assumptions about man. 
Questions , such as t he following abstracted from Nilsen, 
should be asked by the critic. 
I . What is the speaker ' s concept of man? 
A. What concept of man is reflected by: 
1 . The manner in which he speaks 
2 . The language he employs 
3. The information he presents or f a ils to 
present 
4 . The issues he chooses 
5. The questions he raises 
6 . The faiths he generates 
7 . The doubts he implies 
8 . The feelings he appeals to 
9. The process of choice he inspires . 
B. Does the speech reveal an image of man as 
a being of intrinsic worth, or of one whose 
worth as a personality derives from 
possessions, characteristics , or creed? 
C. Is the image of man that of being with a 
capacity for wisdom and rational choice, 
the exercise of whose rationality in the 
light of growing wisdom it is the speaker ' s 
obligation to encourage? 
D. Does the speech deal honestly with men? 
1. Does it realistically relate them to 
the problems they face or does it 
raise spurious alarm or spurious complacency? 
2. Does the speech imply that men must grow 
in understanding of themselves and the 
world about them or that they should 
forsake the dangers of thought for 
the safety of convention? 
17Ibid . , p . 90 . 
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3. Does the speech falsely flatter men 
to their immediate gratification but 
long term peril? 
E. Does the speech encourage respect for the 
spirit of free men? 
The Concept of Ideas . 
The speaker ' s concept of ideas , Nilsen admits , i s 
inseparable from his concept of man . Specifically , however , 
he is concerned with whether the speaker uses ideas 
instrumentally or manipulatively . 
If ideas are used instrumentally the speaker is 
concerned first with their validity and the creative 
social action resulting from that validity. 
I f ideas are used manipulatively they are instruments 
for contrivance , not validity or creativeness . In the 
sophistic tradition they give effectiveness to the speaker , 
not to the truth . 
Nilsen also realizes the limitations of public 
address as a medium for dealing with ideas . 
The trut h is often complicated , and the time of 
a speech is short . Few audiences can or will fol l ow 
closely reasoned discourse . Simple alternatives , 
personality conflicts , drf~atized hopes and fears 
are enormously appealing . 
Criticism must be made with allowance for the limitat ions 
mentioned . 
18Ibid., p . 92 . 
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The following questions , abstracted from Nilsen, should 
be asked . 
I . \·Jhat is 
A. Are 
1 . 
2 . 
3 . 
B. Are 
1 . 
2. 
the speaker ' s concept of i deas? 
the ideas used instrumentally? 
Do the ideas have a valid basis? 
Does the speech present ideas so that 
they take on added meaning? 
Do the ideas relate to other significant 
ideas, so that the listener can see 
the world a little more as a whole and 
can use his O'\m. intelligence more 
effectively than before? 
the ideas used mani pulatively? 
Does the speech perpetuate narrow 
meanings? 
Does the speech isolate ideas and avoid 
critical appraisal? 
Are the ideas used to trigger off 
preselected responses? 
The Concept of Society . 
Here Ni lsen thinks of society "as a set of relat ion-
ships among people, a pattern of interactions among men, 
that remains more or less stable . 1119 The function of 
the critic is to reveal what concept of society the 
speech reflects; this involv es how men should choose and 
act , how the speaker would have them fulfill themselves . 
The speaker ' s concept of society cannot be judged 
by looking only at explicit expressions of bel ief. For 
example, some men who speak of democracy have an inadequate 
understanding of what democracy involves . " The speaker ' s 
concept of society must be seen i n the values the speech 
19Ibid., p . 93 . 
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embodies and the social processes it promotes , " says 
Nilsen.20 The following questions, may be asked: 
I . What is the speaker ' s concept of society? 
Procedure: 
A. i.~Jhat does the speech imply about rationality, 
tolerance , and the moral autonomy of the 
individual? 
B. What does the speech imply about the expression 
of opinions, deliberation , persuasion, free 
inquiry, free criticism, and free choice? 
C. What does the speech imply about discussion 
and debate, the use of information, the 
interchange of ideas, the function of 
opposition, and attitudes toward what is 
orthodox and unorthodox in thought and 
action? 
Although there is some overlap in the criteria used 
to interpret concepts of man , ideas, and society, each 
set will be applied categorically to the entire speech. 
All the questions within a set may not be applied 
categorically; they will be applied if they pertain to 
the speech . 
The speaker ' s background and the history of the 
issues with which he dealt will also be used to present 
a responsible interpretive criticism. The contents of 
Chapters II and III will provide the needed background 
which will be used only as it pertains to specific questions 
to be answered . 
20Ibid . 
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In order to function meaningfully as an interpretive 
critic it is often necessary to explicitly identify some 
rhetorical terms in order to point to the larger implicative 
concepts of man, ideas , and society. Croft points out 
" · •• that the rhetorical form is only an aid in evaluating 
the success with which a speaker selected and established 
the most appropr i ate idea relationships in the speech . "21 
The following rhetorical glossary of the seven forms of 
verbal supports , the three modes of persuasion , and t he 
list of stylistic devices is included to aid the reader . 
These rhetorical terms are used only to help clarify 
the concepts of man, ideas and society . 
Alan H. Monroe in his work Principles and Types of 
Speech notes that there are seven forms of verbal suppor t . 
He lists and explains them as follows : 
1 . Explanation-" ••• a simple , concise exposition, 
setting forth the relation between a 
whole and i ts parts or making clear 
an abscure term." 
2 . Analogy or Comparison- This is where "· • • similar-
ities are pointed out between 
that which is already known, 
or believed, and that which 
is not ." , 
3 . Statistics-" ••• figures used to show the proportion 
of instances of a certain kind, to show 
how many or few or great or small they are ." 
21Albert J . Croft , "The Functions of Rhetorical 
Criticism, " Quarterly Journal of Speech , XLII ( October , 1956), 
289 . 
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4 . Illustratj_on-" ••• a detailed example of the idea 
or statement to be supported . It is 
the narration of an incident to bring 
out the point you are trying to make • ••• 
There are two principle types of illus-
tration : the hypothetical and the factual . 
The former tells a story which could have 
happened or probably will happen; the 
latter tells what actually has happened. " 
5. Specific instances -" •• • are condensed forms of 
factual illus trations . They 
are undetailed examples . 
6 . Testimony-"Another person ' s statement used to support 
the ideas of the speaker ••• " 
7. Restatement-" • •• s aying the same thing , but saying 
it in a different way. 11 22 
The three modes of persuasion , ethos, pathos , and 
logos, are explained by Leste r Thonssen and A. Craig Baird 
in Speech Criticism as f ollows : 
(New 
Ethos or Ethical Proof-" The constituents of ethical 
proof are character , sagacity, 
and good will . 11 23 This proof 
focuses on how the audience 
views the speaker . 
Pathos or Emotional Proof- " The speaker i s usually con-
sidered an interpreter of the 
mood or emot i onal state which 
he propos~~ to induce in the 
hearers ." This proof focuses 
on how the speaker views the 
audience in terms of their 
predispositions to accept or 
reject the pattern of belief or 
action. 
22Alan H. Monroe , Principles and Types of Speech 
ed.; Chicago : Scott , Foresman, and Co ., 1962) , pp . 195- 207 . 
23Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird ~ Speech Cri t icism 
York : The Ronald Press Company , 1948J , p . 386. 
24Ibid . , p . 365 . 
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Logos or Logical Proof- The concern is with rational 
demonstration involving integrity 
of ideas, cogency of reasoning, 
and the examination of evidence.25 
Richard A. Lanham in his work A Handlist of Rhetorical 
Terms notes that there are many stylistic devices . He lists 
and defines some of them as follows: 
1 . Hyperbole-"Exaggerated ••• terms used for emphasis ••• " 
2. Icon-"Painting resemblance by imagery." 
3. Onomatopoeia-"Words that sound like their meaning." 
4. Cataplexis-"A threat of punishment, misfortune, 
or disaster. 
5. Peroration-"An impassioned sumniary." 
6. Simile-" One thing is likened t o another, dissimilar 
thing by the use of like, as , etc. 11 
7. Alliteration-" Recurrence of an initial consonant 
S0lli"'1d. • • 11 
8 . Anaphora-"Repetition of the same word at the 
beginning of successive clauses or verses." 
9. Isocolon-"Repetition of phrases of equal length and 
usually corresponding structure ." 
10. Metaphor-"Explicit comparison . II • • 
11 . Climax-"Mount ing by degrees through words or 
sentences of i~greasing weight and in parallel 
construction. " 
25Ibid ., pp . 331-346 . 
26Richard A. Lanham, A Handlist of Rhetorical Terms 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1969), pp . 117-139. 
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Sum.7nary 
This chapter was designed to introduce the study . 
It included sections on the purpose and significance of 
the study, review of the literatu re , organizat ion of t he 
paper , criteria and procedure to be followed . 
The criteria discussed can be outlined as follows: 
I . 1.~lhat is the speaker ' s concept of man? 
II . 
A. What concept of man is reflected by : 
1 . The manner in which he speaks 
~ . The language he employs 
3 . The information he presents or fail s 
to present 
4 . The issues he chooses 
5. The questions he raises 
6 . The faiths he generates 
?. The doubts he i mplies 
8 . The feelings he appeals to 
9. The process of choic e he inspires . 
B. Does the speech reveal an image of man as 
a being of intrinsic worth , or of one whos e 
worth as a personality derives from poss essions , 
characteristics , or creed? 
C. Is the image of man that of being with a 
capacity fo r wisdom and rational choice? 
D. Does the speech deal honestly wit h man? 
E. Does the speech encour age respect fo r the 
spirit of free men? 
What is 
A. Are 
1 . 
2 . 
3 . 
B. Are 
1 . 
the speaker ' s concept of ideas? 
the ideas used instrumentally? 
Do the ideas have a valid basis? 
Does the speech present ide as so that 
they take on added meaning? 
Do the ideas relate to other significant 
ideas , so t hat the listener can see 
the wor ld a little more as a whole and 
can use his own intelligence more 
effecti vely than before? 
the ideas used manipulatively? 
Does the speech perpetuate narrow 
meanings? 
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2 . Does the speech isolate ideas and avoid 
critical appraisal? 
3. Are the ideas used to trigger off 
preselected responses? 
III . What is the speaker's concept of society? 
A. What does the speech imply about rationality , 
tolerance , and the moral autonomy of the 
individual? 
B. What does the speech imply about the expression 
of opinions, deliberation , persuasion, free 
inquiry, free criticism, and free choice? 
C. What does the speech imply about discussion 
and debate, the use of information , the 
interchange of ideas , the function of opposition 
and attitudes toward what is orthodox and 
unorthodox in thought and acti on? 
The following chapter delves into Mr . Stevenson ' s 
life and will aid the reader by giving him a clearer 
perspective as he confronts the remaining chapters of this 
study. 
CHAPTER II 
The Speaker 
In the fall of 1893 Helen Davis married Lewis 
Stevenson in what was the biggest social event of the 
year in Bloomington, Illinois . 27 Their marriage aroused 
a great deal of interest because Helen's father, W. O. 
Davis, owned the highly influential Republican newspaper , 
the Bloomington Pantagraph , and Lewis's father, Adlai E. 
Stevenson, was the Democratic Vice- President of the 
United States . 
Following their highly publicized wedding the 
Stevensons moved to Washington . Lewis worked as a 
secretary for his father until his term as Vice- President 
expired in 1896 ~ After that the Stevensons moved to 
New Mexico and Lewis managed a copper mine there fo r 
a short time . He proved to be an astute manager both of 
finances and men and was soon offered the job of general 
manager of the Los Angeles Examiner , a widely circulat ed 
newspaper . 28 The Stevensons who numbered three now 
.(Lewis , Helen and Elizabeth) moved to Los Angeles . 
27Kenneth S . Davis , The Politics of Honor (New 
York : G. P. Putnam ' s Sons, 1967) , p . 18 . 
28Ibid . 
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On February 5 , 1900 the Stevensons ' second child 
was born . He was named Adlai E. Stevenson after his 
paternal grandfa ther . 
The young boy was thrown in the political limelight 
at an early a ge . When he was only six months old his 
pictur e appeared in the Chicago American . 29 He was 
photographed sitting on his grandfather Stevenson ' s 
knee and the caption below the picture read : "The next 
Vice- President and his Grandson . 11 30 The senior Mr . 
Stevenson was making his second bid for Vice President 
of the United States but this time his ticket was headed 
by William Jennings Bryan r ather than Grover Cleveland. 
Young Adlai E. Stevenson ' s early childhood was 
filled with many memorable events . Some of his happiest 
moments were spent at his maternal grandfather ' s summer 
cottage at Charlevoix, Michigan. 31 'While visiting their 
grandfather in Michi gan , both Adlai and his sis t er , Elizabeth, 
were kept bus;r swimming , boa ting, drawing , hiking , listening 
and observing nature . 32 They also enjoyed listeni ng to 
stories and poems read to them e i ther by their mother or 
29rbid ., p . 39. 
30Ibid. 
31Kenneth S. Davis , A Prophe t in His Own Country 
(New York : Doubleday & Company, 1957) , p . 44 • 
. 32Ibid . 
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their grandfather Davis . 
hih.en Adlai was seven his parents moved back to 
Bloomineton , Illinois and, after getting everything settled 
properly a t 1316 E. Hashington Street , Adlai , Elizabeth, 
and Helen Stevenson accompanied Mr . W. O. Davis to Winter 
Park , Florida for an extended vacation. 33 In Winter 
Park, Adlai attended his first public school but he was 
described as : ". • • a pretty raw scholar . • • • 11 34 
In the spring of 1907 the Stevenson ' s returned to 
Illinois and Adlai entered the Bloomington schools to 
finish out the school term. His teacher was Miss 
Catherine Cowles and she was rather disappointed in his 
scholastic ability . She gave Adlai good marks in 
deportment but she gra.ded him low in reading and spelling . 35 
Young Adlai ' s a cademic marks remained low nearly the whole 
time he was in grade school . This was primarily due to 
the fact that each winter his family went South and each 
summer they went North.36 Adlai gained a lot of knowledge 
about the country by traveling but his grades reflected 
his sporadic attendance . 
33Davis, Politics of Honor, p . 39 . 
34rbid ., p . 40 . 
35Davis, A Prophet in His 01.vn Country, p . 49 . 
36Ibid ., p . 60 . 
In December of 1911 the Stevenson ' s set sail fo r 
Europe on the Lusitania . 37 They toured England , Fr ance, 
Italy and Switzerland and saw many places which they 
had only read about previously . For Adlai it was a 
rewarding experience becaus e he made many European friends 
and , the trip stimulat ed Adlai ' s interest in histor y . 38 
When they returned f r om England a year later , Adlai 
was enrolled in the Metcalf Training School in No rmal , 
Illinois . Later he attended the Bloomington High School 
for two years and got his fi r st experience debating. 
II 
. . . In 1915, he upheld the negative in one debate 
on the proposi tion , "Resol ved That the United States 
Should Free the Philippines . 11 39 Stevenson lost his one 
and only school debate . 
rdhen it came time for Adlai E. Stevenson to ent er 
college it was decided he should enter Princeton . He 
needed t o take a col lege entrance exam though and , upon 
doing so , it was concluded t hat Stevenson was not r eady 
for college . The young man took three college entrance 
exams and failed all three . Consequently his par ents 
37Ibid . , p . 62 . 
38Ibid ., p . 64 . 
39Russel ~vindes Jr . and James A. Hobinson , " Publ ic 
Address in the Career of Adlai E. Stevenson , " Quarterly 
J our nal of Speech , XLII ( October , 1956) , 227 . 
- 25-
sent him to Choate , an Eastern preparatory school in 
Connecticut , for two years in order to better prepare 
him for college . 40 
In May of 1917 , Stevenson again took the college 
board examinations and, although he did approximately 
twice as well as he had done the year before , his marks 
still were not high enough to allow him to enter Princeton. 
By 1918 when he again took the college entrance 
exams he received an 88 in trig, 82 in Spanish , 78 in 
French, 74 in algebra , and a 69 in Lat{n . 41 He passed 
the. entrance exams but , the headmaster of Choate, Dr . 
St. John , wrote Helen Stevenson and informed her that 
young Adlai would have a month's drill in the art of 
taking exams . Mr. St . John noted that Adlai had "· •• far 
more knowledge and a far greater intelligence than the 
results of formal testing would indicate ."42 
On September 23 , 1918 Stevenson was admitted to 
Princeton and , although he was just an average schol ar 
he was popular among his classmates . He was elected 
secretary of the Choa te Club of Princeton when he was 
40John Bartlow Martin, Adlai Stevenson (New York : 
Harper & Brothers , 1952) , ~ . 42 . 
4lnavis, Politics of Honor, p. 56 . 
42rbid. 
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just a freshman, and he was elected to the editorial 
board of the Daily Princetonian , the school newspaper . 
By the t i me he was a senior he was elected to the Senior 
Council , which was the student governing body, and he was 
elected editor of the school newspaper . Both of these 
extra curricular activities kept him continually busy, 
but he still managed to take a stiff schedule of class 
work which allowed him to graduate in 1922 . 43 
Upon graduat ion from Princeton , Adlai rather 
reluctantly entered the Harvard law school . He really 
wanted to pursue a career in journalism but his father 
decided it was eood to have a law degr ee to fall back 
upon . The young Stevenson studied law for two years 
then went to work for the Bloomington Pantagraph, a 
family ovmed newspa per . 44 
Alden l;lhi tman, one of Mr . Stevenson ' s biographers 
notes that : 
\t.Jhen ht s interes t in becoming a newspaper editor 
waned, he enrolled in the law school at Northwestern 
University in Chicago and took his degree in 1926 . 
But before he settled down to practice , he took 
another swing through Europe ••• This time, though, 
he included the Soviet Union •••• ~5 
43Elizabeth Stevenson Ives and Hildegarde Dolson, 
My Brother Adlai (New York: William Morrow & Company, 
195'6)' p . 160. 
(New 
44 Alden 1:./hi tman , _P_o_r_t_r_a_i_t_: __ A_d_l_a_1_· _P_,_,_. _s_t _e_v_e_n_s_o_n 
Yor k : Harper & Row, 1965) , p . 16 . 
45rbid. , p . 17 . 
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In 1927 , when Stevenson returned from abroad , he 
moved to Chicago and joined the law firm of Cutting , 
Moore, and Sidley. The job kept him extremely busy and 
he worked long hours every day . He still left some 
time for a social life though . He soon became well 
known in the Chicap,o social circles, but in 1928 his 
bachelor days ended . He married Ellen Borden , a Chicago 
debutante , who was nine years younger than he . 
After taki ng an extended honeymoon to Africa the 
Stevensons returned to Chicago and Adlai became act ive 
in civic affair s . He joined the Chicago Council on 
Foreign Relations, a citizens' group that invited 
expert s or notables to inform them about events abroad. 46 
Stevenson ' s first major opportunity to develop his forensic 
talents came when he was elected to the presidency of the 
council . 47 His duty then was to introduce the visiting 
dignitaries . Stevenson worked on his introduc tions 
assiduously for he was dreadfully afraid to speak before 
48 the group . At first he used little cue cards to hel p 
him wit h his introductions and later then , after much 
practice , he was able to introduce the speaker s in a 
46Ibid ., p . 18. 
47windes and Robins on, p . 227 . 
47Ibid. 
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"charmingly spontaneous" way by memorizing a succession 
of ideas.4 9 
Stevenson met a number of influential people through 
the Foreign Relations Council and, in 1933 he was asked 
to help organiz~ the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. 
He was in ·washington for about one year to help organize 
the AAA and, as a lawyer , he was able to help a great deal 
because he had had previous experience salvaging farm 
50 
mortgages and managing farm properties for others . 
He soon returned to his law practice in Chicago 
and , in 1935 he became a partner in the firm . He did 
not stay in Chicago for long though because soon he was 
asked by Frank Knox to come to Washington and be his 
assistant . Knox was the Secretary of the Navy and, he 
told Stevenson , he needed a legal advisor . Stevenson 
immediately accepted the post then moved his family 
to Washington . 
Stevenson was given an office outside Knox ' s where 
he performed much of the portly Secretary's legal 
work, ghosted his speeches , acted as deputy, briefed 
him when he had to testify before Congressional 
Committees . Stevenson was an affable , hard- working 
well- inf ormed factotum ; gnd he got to know virtually 
everybody in Washington . )l 
49rbid . 
50Whitman , p . 19 . 
51Ibid . , p . 20 . 
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Mr . Stevenson traveled extensively for Mr . Knox 
and, in a three year period, he flew some two hundred 
thousand miles throughout the United States , into the 
Pacific, across the Caribbean, across the Atlantic to 
North Africa and Europe . 52 During his travels he met 
many influential people and established friendships which 
lasted a lifetime . 
Stevenson worked for Mr . Knox until 1944. Then, 
because he had proven to be such an effective negotiator, 
Stevenson was asked to be a delegate for the United 
Nations Conference at San Francisco in April of 1945. 53 
He was put in charge of the American delegation the 
following August when the United Nations ' Commission 
met in London . In London, Stevenson again proved to be 
a successful negotiator and he got along well with 
diplomats from all over the world. 
He returned to Chicago and by this time he was 
interested in seeking a political career . In 1948, 
Illinois needed a Governor and a Senator and, after 
much deliberation by Democratic party leaders, Stevenson 
was finally nominated for Governor . Nobody really 
believed he could win the election because he was relatively 
unknovm to anyone outside of Chicago . He based his 
52navis, Politics of Honor, p . 150 . 
53rbid., p . 22 . 
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campaign theme on corruption of Illinois politics and 
he staged an excellent fight against his Republican 
opponent , Dwi ght Green . Stevenson had a twelve point 
program for reform . He proposed to : 
••• i mprove Ill i nois 's inefficient and inequitable 
taxing system ; increase t he proportion of total tax 
revenue going to cities; abolish flagrant corruption 
in state purchasing ; call a constitutional convention ; 
overhaul the state ' s public-welfare system; begin a 
long- term road building program ; establish a state 
Fair Employment Practice commission ; strengthen the 
mine safety laws ; increase financial aid to schools; 
increase the effic iency and economy of state 
administration; take the police out of pol i tics 
and remove parasites and the n~mes of nonexistent 
employees f rom state payrolls . ?4 
Despite a shortage of camp~ign funds Stevenson won 
the election . He was installed as the thirty- first governor 
of Illinois on January 10 , 1949 . 
"From the moment of his gubernatorial victory in 
1948 Adlai Stevenson had been talked of for President . 11 55 
The talk increased when he tried to carr y out his campaign 
promises . At the end of his four year term he had pushed 
through the General Ass embly two thirds of the legislation 
he had promised . 56 By 1 952 he had cleaned up Illinois ' s 
politics considerably but he still was not satisfied . 
He announced that he would seek re - election , and he told 
the press r epeatedly t hat he was not interested in becoming 
54navis , A Prophet in His Own Country , p . 301 . 
55Davis, The Politics of Honor , p . 253 . 
56rbid ., p . 224 . 
- 31-
the Democratic nomi nee for president . He was continually 
pressur ed by many Democratic leaders . Several of them , 
including President Truman, felt he was t he best qualif i ed 
man for the job. Nevertheless Stevenson remained firm 
and, in an effort to end the rumors that he would be a 
candidate , he made the following statement to the press 
on April 17 , 1952 . 
I have repeatedly said that I was a candidate for 
Governor of Illinois and had no other ambition . To 
this I must now add that in view of my prior 
commitment to run for Governor and my desire and 
the desire of many who have given their help and 
confidence in the unfinished work in Illinois, I 
could not accept the nomination for any other office 
this summer . 'J7 
His emphatic statement seemed to quiet the rumors 
temporarily . Speculation flared up again though when 
the Democratic National Convention was held in Chicago 
on July 21 , 1952 . As Governor of the host state Stevenson 
gave the opening address . His speech took many delegates 
by surprise for it was not the usual welcoming address . 
He used wit extremely well in his short speech and, within 
minutes he sent his audience into gales of laughter . 58 
Stuart Brov.rn noted in his book about Stevenson that his 
57rbid . , p . 264 . 
58rbid . , p . 268 . 
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welcoming address signaled " · •• the beginning of a 
different kind of political oration; and the introduction, 
• •• of a new eloquence . 11 59 
Within a couple of days it became evident to him 
that his name would be placed in nomination so he began 
the l aborious task of writing an acceptance speech. " He 
wrote, as always, on a ruled yellow tablet , in longhand , 
slowly , painfully, conferring often •••• 1160 
Stevenson was nominated and , when the third ballot 
was taken , he officially became the Democratic Presidential 
nominee . From then on he began his rigorous campaign . 
His opponent was a national war hero , Dwight D. Eisenhower . 
From the onset of the campaign Stevenson knew his task 
would be extremely difficult but he campaigned hard anyway . 
Although his schedule was tight he devoted three 
to four hours each day to speechwriting . 61 He had several 
speech writers working for him , but he always edited their 
material considerably . Throughout the course of the 
campaign he made 200 speeches , traveled 30 ,000 miles , and 
visited 32 states . 62 Even so, when the country went to 
59stu§lrt Gerry Broi.m, Conscience in Poli t i cs 
(Massachusetts: Colonial Press , Inc . , 1961) , p . 7. 
60Davis, A Prophet in His Ovm Country, p . 402 . 
61Windes and Robinson, p . 232 . 
62~1hitman, p. 104. 
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the polls in November, Eisenhower won by a plurality of 
six and a half million votes. 
After losing the electi on, he traveled tens of 
thousands of miles through thirty foreign countries and 
observed the foreign situation first hand. While on his 
tour he gave numerous speeches and spoke with everyone 
from ' cobblers to kings. 1 63 When he returned, nearly 
six months later , he was asked to speak on various 
occasions .· He had so many requests to speak that it 
was virtually impossible to accept them all . He also 
was kept busy writing articles for various magazines, 
and a book titled , Call to Greatness . 
In 1954 he decided to resume his private law 
practice in Chicago but the demands for public appearances 
were too great . He was asked to deliver the Godkin 
Lectures at Harvard University and, since it was another 
election year, he also was asked to campaign for numerous 
Democratic hopefuls. 
In 1954 he made eighty speeches in states where 
Senatorial or gubernatorial seats were being 
contested . From September 18 to Election Day, 
November 2, he campaigned in thirty-three states and 
in Alaska. It was an exhausting performance •••• 64 
His campaigning seemed to help the candidates through 
63Ibid. , p . io9 . 
64rbid ., p. 130 . 
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for the democrates gained two seats in the Senate, nineteen 
in the House and nine governors . This large Democratic 
victory assured Stevenson of the Presidential nomination 
in 1956 . 65 
Stevenson became the Democratic nominee for 
President on August 16 , 1956 , and from then on he waged 
another hard fight . His opponent again was Mr . Eisenhower . 
The second campaign was much different than the firs t . 
In 1952 Stevenson had been criticized for being too 
witty , too intellectual , and too indecisive . I n 1956 
he tried to correct his previous errors . He left nearl y 
all the brainwork--- the actual writing of speeches and 
policy statements--- to his staff and he was free to 
concentrate wholly on public appearances and personal 
pol i ticking . 66 Again he traveled extensively and sometimes 
he delivered eight or nine speeches in a single day. 
Throughout the entire campaign Stevenson worked 
hard and rarely left any time for relaxation . He usually 
got only five hours of s leep per night and , when he made 
a television a ppearance , the lack of sleep was appar ent. 
II 
• • • The image of him projected on TV screens was, 
ver y often , precisely the opposite of that intended when 
65rbid ., p . 133 · 
66Davis , The.Pol i t ics of Honor , p . 337. 
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the campaign was planned . He often appeared tired , 
driven , harassed , his delivery stumbling and awkward 
as it had never been befor e . 11 67 Consequently when 
the public went to the polls to vote on November 7, 1956 , 
Eisenhower came out victor ious for the second time . 
After the 1956 election Stevenson returned to his 
farm in Illinois and relaxed for a s hort time by playing 
tennis , riding and hunting . This soon became boring for 
such an active man as Stevenson so he resumed his law 
pr actice and gave a few speeches to reduce the party debt . 
In 1958 he went to Eastern and ~estern Europe , Asia 
and Africa . He became increasingly alarmed at the social 
and economic situations in the United States and abroad 
and , upon his return home he started writing a r ticles 
again . Soon he was speaking before colleges a nd civic 
groups and, there was some speculation that he might run 
for President again in 1960 . 
In August of 1960 when the Democratic National 
Convention was held in Los Angeles , California , Mr . 
Stevenson had a few supporters but not nearly enough. 
Consequently the nominat ion went to John F. Kennedy and 
Stevenson had to settle for campaigning for Kennedy instead 
of for himself . 
67Ibid . , p . 338 . 
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Mr . Kennedy won the election in 1960 and asked Mr . 
Stevenson to head the United States delegation at the 
United Natj_ons . Stevenson accepted the post but rather 
reluctantly . He actually wanted to be Secretary of the 
State but, because he and Mr . Kennedy did not get along 
too well, he was instead asked to be ambassador of the 
United Nations . 68 
Stevenson adjusted to his new job rapidly and 
quickly gained the confidence of the other delegates . 
He spent endless hours entertaining foreign diplomates 
and he worked diligently polishing his speeches . 69 
During his first year a s Ambassador to the United Nations 
he helped to settle various disputes and, became known as 
a valuable compromiser . 
In 1961 though President Kennedy failed to advise 
Mr . Stevenson on various matters and consequently , 
Stevenson ' s prestige among some of the foreign delegates 
tumbled sharply . 70 More and more Stevenson was becoming 
disgusted with his job for he was oftentimes unconsul t ed 
or misinformed . In the summer of 1963 he asked President 
Kennedy to relieve him from his duties . 71 
6811 Adlai Stevenson of Illinois," Newsweek , (July 
26 , 1965) ' 29 . 
69Whitman , p . 223 . 
7011 Adlai Stevenson of Illinois ." p . 29 . 
71Ibid . 
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Shortly after Kennedyts assasination in 1963, 
Stevenson asked President Johnson to relieve him. 
Johnson, like Kennedy, kept the Ambassador on because he 
needed his prestige and debating skill at the United Nations .72 
For the next few years Stevenson helped the United ---------------
Nations settle disputes over the Cuban missile crisis, 
the Dominicn.n Republic, and Vietnam. His voice was 
heard frequently during times of troubles and his was 
,. 
a voice of compromis e when everything else seemed to 
... 
fail . 
In July of 1965 Stevenson was sent to England on 
business. On July 14 he collapsed and died of a heart 
attack on a London street . 
Conclusion 
Chapter I I reviewed Mr . Stevenson ' s heritage, 
schooling, speech training , political achievements, and 
accomplishments as U. N. Ambas s ador. In order to provide 
the necessary background for the rhetorical analysis 
Chapter III discusses the Bay of Pigs incident of 1961 
and enlarges upon the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 . 
72rbid . 
CHAPTER III 
The Cuban Crises 
During the early months of 1961 there had been 
rumors of a United States backed invasion of Cuba to 
overthrow Fidel Castro . 73 Then in February, Cuba char ged 
in the United Hations that the United States was planning 
direct intervention . Adlai E. Stevenson , as United 
States Ambassador, immediately denied the charge . The 
rumors persisted though. Finally President Kennedy stated 
emphatically that "· •• the United States would not 
intervene in Cuba under any conditions to bring about 
Castro ' s downfal1 . 11 74 
On April 15, 1961 three Cuban military air bases 
were attacked and bombed by eight b- 26 ' s. Cuba ' s Foreign 
Minister, Raul Roa , immediately charged that the United 
States was wholly responsible for what had happened . 75 Roa 
stated at the U. N. that the invasion was made ••• ' by 
a force of mercenaries organized, financed , and armed by 
the government of the United States .'76 The charge was 
73whitman, Portrait : Adlai E. Stevenson, p . 219 . 
74-Ibid . , p . 220 . 
75Davis, Politics of Honor , p . 457. 
76Ibid . 
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again denied at the United Nations and i n Washington. 
Two days later, on April 17, 1~00 Cuban exiles 
landed on t he swampy southern coast of Cuba . They were 
short of ammunition and supplies and were unable to further 
their plan of attack against the Castro regime without 
further United States aid . The U. S . refused to give them 
more help ; consequently, they were captured by Castro 's 
army . The incident became known as the Bay of Pigs 
invasion and , the tragic fiasco caused a storm of angry 
protest around the world . 77 
Amba ssador Stevenson was both s hocked and hurt to 
learn that President Kennedy had intentionally kept 
important information from him and consequently he 
unknowingly lied to members of the U. N. by repeatedly 
denying U. S. involvement in Cuba . 
In the aftermath , the prestige of both Ambassador 
Stevenson and the United States ' government was damaged 
considerably and , the ill- feelings b etween Cuba and 
the United States persisted . 
In the f all of 1961, Cuba began to issue numerous 
complaints to the U. N. Security Council . Their first 
complaint was t hat the U. S. had intervened in the 
Dominican Republic . Mr . Stevenson spoke to the Security 
Council on November 22 , 1961 regarding this matter . He 
77rbid . 
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poLnted out to both Cuba and the Soviet Union that 
''• •• t he United States has not sent forces against the 
Dominican Republic •••• 11 78 Stevenson further enhanced 
his country ' s position in ~is next speech to the Secur ity 
Council which was delivered six days later . He quoted the 
Dominican ~cpublic repr esentative , Mr . Sanchez y Sanchez , 
as saying ' .• • The Dominican Republic does not feel it is 
threatened •••• The Dominican Republic has not been invaded . 
The Dominican ~tepublic has not been threatened with invasion. 
There has been no invas i on in the Dominican Republi c .• 79 
This statement seemed · to satisfy the Security Council and 
fr i ction between Cuba :and the U. S . t emporarily subsided 
again . 
In March of 1962 the feud was renev;ed with vigor . 
Cuba was angered because she had recently been ousted from 
the Organization of Arperican States , a twenty member 
r egional organization 1affiliatod with the U. N. whose over-
all purpos e is to maintain i n ternational peace and security . 
Cuba contended that the OAS acted illegally when they 
excluded her from their operations because of her Communistic 
form of government . 
Ambassador Stevr.mson s poke in t he U. N. Security 
78statcment by Ambassador Adla i ~ . Stevenson to the 
Security Council , i'rovember 22 , 1961 , U .s . /U . N. Press 
Release No . 385l+. 
70 / Statement by Ambassador Stevenson to the Security 
Council , November 28 , 1961, U. S . /U . N. ?ress Release No . 3863 . 
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Council on March 15, 16, and 23, deali ng with this charge . 
He pointed out Cuba had violated the charter of the OAS 
and has " . • • conducted aggressive and subversive activities 
against other American Republics •• • • 11 80 He furthermore 
pointed out that since the OAS operated as a regional 
organizat i on it had the right to exclude any country whose 
aims 1:1ere contrary to the principles of the American Sys t em . 
A vote was taken i n the U. N. Security Council 
following Mr . Stevenson ' s remarks of March 23 . The Security 
Council voted 7 to 2 against Cuba ' s resolution and maintained 
that the OAS had not acted illegally when they barred Cuba 
from their organization . 
After the vote the dissension between Cuba and the 
U. S . temporarily subsided for the third time . 
The pinnacle of the Cuban crises occured seven months 
later , however , in October of 1962 . On the 16th of Oc tober, 
American reconnaissance planes returning from Cuba had 
photographs which proved that the Soviet Union was placing 
missiles and atomic weapons in Cuba . 81 When analyzed by 
experts the photographs "· •• showed beyond doubt that 
the Soviets had begun construction near San Cr istobal of 
a medium- ranee ballistic missile base , a complex of from 
80statement by Ambassador Stevenson to the Secur ity 
Council , March 23 , 1962 , U. S . /U. N. Press Release No . 3948. 
81Robert F . Kennedy , Thirteen Days (New York : . 
W. W. Norton & Company , Inc ., 1968), p . 23 . 
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sixteen to twenty- four nuclear- tipped rockets whose r ange 
of 1100 nautical miles i ncluded Washington, St . Louis , Dall as, 
and of course all the Strategic Air Command bases south of 
that arc . 11 82 
This news greatly alarmed the President of the United 
States and his political advisors . Instead of doing any-
thing rash or hasty though they decided to consider several 
alternatives ~nd weigh the consequences . The discussion 
group , consisting of a few advisors and the National 
Security Council , offered several possible solutions . 
The group consider ed : (l)doing nothing , (2)using strong 
military force , and (3)installing a blockade on Cuba . 83 
On October 17 , the problem grew even more alarming . 
More pictures had been taken and analyzed ; the newer 
pictur es showed evidence of three intermedi ate- r ange 
ballistic missile sites. These missiles were far more 
powerf ul than those found previously . The newer missil es 
had a range of 2200 miles and could reach to almost the 
farthest corner of the continental United States . 84 
The President ' s council met for the second time . 
The same solutions were suggested but no definite action 
was taken . Finally , on Sunday the twenty- first of October , 
82Davis , Politics of Honor , p . 475. 
83Kennedy, Thirteen Days , p. 36 . 
84Davis , Politics of Honor , p . 478 . 
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the President and his advisors decided upon a course of 
action . They decided upon a blockade . 
On Monday evening the President spoke to the 
American people via nat ionwide television . He told the 
world of the Soviet missiles; he also told the Soviet 
leaders to '· •• halt and eliminate this clandestine , 
reckless and provocative threat to world peace •••• 1 85 
Kennedy furthermore announced that '· •• all ships of 
any kind bound for Cuba from whatever nation or port will , 
if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons , be tur ned 
back . r 86 
The following day , Tuesday, October 23, 1962 , 
Adlai E. Stevenson presented the American case to the 
U.N . Security Council . The speech was heard by representa-
tives from 3ritain, Nationalist China, France , U. S. S. R., 
Chile , Guana , Ireland , Rumania , the United Arab Republic 
and Venezuela . Also important to Ambassador Stevenson 
was his secondary audience which consisted of correspondents 
of more than 450 newspapers and periodicals and about 125 
radio and television stations . 87 There were also 
hundreds of curious Amer icans and foreigners who enter ed 
85Ibid . , p . 481 . 
861bid . 
87Michael Prosser, "Adlai E. Stevenson ' s United 
Nations Audience , " Central States Speech Journal , XVI 
(November , 1965) , 269 . 
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and left the Council chambers hour after hour . 88 
In Mr . Stevenson ' s eloquent and persuasive address 
for world peace he noted that 11 • • • the Soviet · action in 
Cuba has created a new and dan&erous situation • • • which 
imperils the security of all mankind. 11 89 He offered a 
way out of the calamitous situation by urging withdrawal 
from Cuba of all missiles and other offensive weapons . 
On the following day, Wednesday, October 24 , 1961 , 
Acting Secretary General of the U.N . , U Thant, sent identical 
letters to both Mr . Khrushchev and President Kennedy 
suggesting that there be a 'voluntary suspension of al l 
arms shipments to Cuba and also 
• • •. of the quarantine 
measures . 1 90 Mr . Khrushchev of the Soviet Union agreed 
with the letter but Mr. Kennedy did not. The U. S. 
President pointed out that the ' threat was created by the 
secret introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba , and 
the answer lies in the removal of such weapons . 1 91 
The threat of nuclear war remained acute until 
Thursday afternoon when the U.N. Security Council met 
again. The Soviet Ambassador to the U. N. , Valerian 
88rbid., p. 270 . 
89statement by Ambassador Stevenson to the Security 
Council , October 23, 1962, U. S./U. N. Press Release No . 4070. 
90Davis, Politics of Honor, p. 482 . 
91Ibid . 
- 45-
Zorin , spoke briefly Rnd noted that the U.S . l acked 
evidence to prove their assertion th~t offensive missiles 
were actually located in Cuba . Ambassador Stevenson became 
angered by Mr . Zorin ' s speech and r eplied with a simple, 
straightforward question. He remarked : "Do you , Ambassador 
Zarin, deny that the U. S. S . R. has placed and is plac ing 
medium and intermediate- range miss i les and sites in Cuba? 
Yes or No? Don't wait for the translat ion. Yes or No? " 
When the Soviet Ambassador failed to reply promptly , 
Stevenson angrily retorted : " I 'm prepa red to wait f or my 
answer until hell freezes over . 11 92 Stevenson then con-
tinued his speech and began to display before the 
Security Council the enl a r ged photographs taken by the 
air r econnais sance of the exact missile sites . 
Shortly after Mr . Stevenson ' s speech the Council 
adjourned , and within a few days the missile- carrying 
Soviet ships bound for Cuba changed course and the 
final Cuban crisis was averted . 
Chapter IV presents a rhetorical analys is of the 
historical speech delivered by Ambassador Stevenson 
on October 23 , 1962 . 
92rbig_., p . 484 . 
Analysis and Evaluat1on of the Speech 
In order to analyze and evaluate the speech 
delivered by Ambassador Stevenson to the U. N. Security 
Council on October 23 , 1962, it was first necessary to 
read and outline the spee ch .* As this was done special 
attention was focused upon Mr. Stevenson ' s concept of 
ideas, man and society. 
The quest ions contained in the criteria for analysis 
were dealt with only as they pertained to the selected 
speech. If two or more criteria tended to overlap when 
applied to the speech only one criterion was used to avoid 
redundancy. For exawple, it was often difficult to 
differentiate between "faiths" and "feelings'' revealing 
concepts of man . 
Usiug '£homas Nilsen 's criteria. to determine the 
_... §;peaker~ s _ concepts of man, ideas anci socie t y the foll owing 
questions were appl1ed cates orically to the speech. 
The Speaker ' s Concept of Man 
1. What concept of man is re.fleeted by the issues 
~.r. Stevenson chooses? 
*For tne conv enience of the re ader a complete text 
of Hr. Stevenson's speech appears in Appendix A. 
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Mr . Stevenson beg ins by stating the purpose of his 
speech. 11 I have a siced for an emergency meeting of the 
Security Council to bring to your a ttention a grave threat 
to the Western Hemisphere and to the peace of the world." 
The major issue then is one of peace. He a l s o chooses the 
issues of Ru.ssia 1 s activities and relationshi p to the U. N. 
'i1 
Charter, and the United Sts.tes ' ac"tivities and relationship 
to the U .N . . Charter to place the Cuban missile crisis 
in perspective. Here he implies faith in the Security 
Council to fairly weig h the issues. 
2 . What concept of man is reflected by the information 
he presents or fails to present? 
By reviewing basic information about the purpose 
of the U.N. and details of the Ouoan missile crisis, 
Mr. Stevenson rev eals man as a be1n8 with a capacity for 
wisdom and rational choice. He implies faith in man's 
ability to make a cogent choice if provided with sufficient 
. . 
evidence . Likewise, he g enerates faith in his fellow man 
and especiallj in the Seciurity Council when he states the 
followin g : "I know that this Council w'i'll approach the . 
issue with a full sense of our respons~bility and a 
solemn unders tanding of the import of our ·deliberations." 
3. What concept of man is reflected oy the quest ions he -
raise s? 
-.......... 
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Hr. S tev erls on also notes th8.t ma n may make wrong 
choices. He asks: 
I have often wondered what the world would be like 
today if the situation at the end of the war had 
been reversed-if tGe United State s had been ravaged 
and shattere d by y.;a.r, an d. i f the Soviet Union had 
emerg ed intact in exclusive possession of the ~tomic 
bomb a nd overwhe lming military and economic mig ht . 
Would it have followed the same 9ath a nd devoted 
itself to r ealizing the world of the Charter? 
This rhetorical question reveals doubt that men will always 
make noble choices . He further doubts that any n~tion is 
entitled to im pose its ideas of what is rig ht on others . 
·rhis is brought out later when he says: ''We doubt whether 
any nation h a s so absolute a grip on absolute truth tha t 
it is entitled to i mpose lts i de a s of wha t is right on 
others." 
4 . What concept of ma n is reflected by the language he 
employs? 
Mr. Stevenson ' s l a n3 uae;e reveals two concept ::; : 
(a)the concept t hat man appreciates a r e fined and cogent 
rhetoric a nd (b)the concept that a spea~er is obligated 
to produce a refined r hetoric . 
:r-ri:r. Stevenson ' s lang uag e focuses on his p:.:.trticular 
audience . His selected l a ng uage reflects his own belief 
in man ' s respons ib ility to artistically manipula te language 
in order to provide a variety of symbolism increasing the 
possibilitie s of understanding . One e xarn ple of the var iety 
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ol' languae;e used by Er • .Stevenson i s r eflected in his use 
of the simile , s ue ~ as : 11 'rhe Ia i th of the Charter is • . . 
dedi c a ted to nations living toge ther as g ood ne i ghb ors 
in peace . '' 
His s~illful use of non - t e chnical language is also 
noted in his use of tne anaphora and t he isocolon . His 
use of introductory .:>hrases such as "we have " anti. " if Cuba 
has '' illustra t e 3t evenson ' s use of a ud ience contact language . 
He ls r "'ts 'e ,... · s "he 11 .""nd "we" . a o ep~ .:i 1'C y pronouns -=>ucn a : · -
The image r y he us es likewise provides a variety 
of symbolism for his listeners . He us e s such colorful 
phrases a B "iron laws,' ' 11 co mpt.i.lsiv e intervention," and 
"grim , cost ly , dis t :::.s teful execution s ," ·tlhen r e f erring to 
tne system of Communism operating within Cuba . 
Tne speaker ' s stylistic r esponsib ility to the ~udience 
is a lso seen throug hout the speech throug h Mr . Stevenson ' s 
skillful use of t he cataplexis , climax and perora tion . 
Using c a taple x i s Stevenson says : "If we do not stand firm 
here , our adversa ries may think that we will s t and firm 
nowhere- and we g uarantee a heightenine; of the world civil 
war to new l eve ls of intensity and danr;e r . 11 
In one of Mr . Stevenson ' s climaxes he notes : 
In our passion fo r peace , we have fo r borne gr eatly . 
But t here must be limlts to for bearance, if fo r bearance 
is not to bec ome the dia8ra~ for the destructi on of 
this Organiza tion . Dr . Cas tro transformed Cuba int o 
a tot a lit <.:.ri ai'.1 dictatorship with impunity- he 
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ex t i.nguished the rig hts of' political freedom with 
impuni ty- -he a U.3ned him s elf with the 3oviet bloc 
with im;Jun l ty- he accepted defensive weapons from 
trie Soviet Union with ii:!puni ty-- -he welcomed thousands 
of Communists i nto Cuba with impunity- but , when , with 
cold delibera tion, he turns his countr y ove r to the 
Soviet Union for a long - r3nAe missile l aunch i ng base, 
and tnus carries the Soviet pro3ram fo r aggression into 
the he ;..trt of the .t\Jnericas , the O.ay of forb earance is 
past. 
This climax r eaffirms Mr . Stevenson ' s idea that a speaker 
i s r esponsible for using stylistic devices th:::.t c 1)r: t;:ic t 
his audience and a~peal to the best in man . His perorat ion 
points this idea out ~lso . He besins his sunmat i on by 
notin!S : 
'r he hopes of mankind Hre concentr ated in this room . 
1r t1e actiun we tai..:e may determine t~1e futur e of 
c ivilizati on . I Kn ow t~at t hi s Council will approach 
the issue wtth a ful l sen se of our responsib i ltty and 
a solemn underst~nding of the lmpo ct of our delibe r ations . 
Taere is a road to peace . The beginning of that 
r oad is marked out in the r eso lution I have submitt ed 
f or your considerati on . I f we act promptly we will 
have another chance to take up again the dreadful 
q ue 3tions of nuclnar arma snd military bases and the 
means and c::?.uses of agg ression and 1va r - to tal\:e them 
up and Jo so:neth"i. ng about them . 
This is a solemn an<l sls ni f icant day for the 
life of the United Nations and the hope of world 
c omm1.rn.i ty . Le t l t be re membered , not as the day wh en 
tne world came to t~e edg e of nucle ~r war , but a s the 
day when ~en r eso l ved to let nothine thece a fte r stop 
the~ in their quest for pea ce . 
5 . Does t~e speech reveal an inag e of man as a being of 
i n t rinsic worth , or of one whos e worth as a personal i ty 
derives from possessi on ~ , char~cteristics or creed? 
Mr . Stevenson ' s U. N. addr ess does reveal ~an as a 
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being of intrinsic ~ort~ . He i mpl i es th~t possessions , 
characteristics anti crcects are inc o.ns e quen ti.:tl to world 
peace 3.nd harmony. He notes that tae U. 3 . r.; ovornmen t 
r e1;:iains CO!lStintly true to tile U . ~j . Ch·:.r t e r 2.nd , in an 
effort to do so , will make every effort t~ cet along with 
people with differln3 po ints of view . de n ote s tha t 
If 
. . . this e arth is quite l~r3e e no u;h to shelter a 
gr dat variety of econ~mic systems , politlcal creeds , 
philosophic al ::, e liefs a nd rel ig ious convictions ." 
6 . Does t l1e speech deSLl hone:3tly with 1nen a:1d realistically 
rel~te t~effi to the proble~s they f~ce or does lt raise 
spurious el~rm or spurious coffip lacenoy? 
Throughout the entire address rfir . Stevenson deals 
hone s tly witi1 ;.'len and r ealt s t ically relates them to t he 
problems t hey face . In e valaa ting and assessing the 
proble!:l 3.t hand the Ambassador not es tha t the situ::i.t!.on i s 
indeed alarming . In the process of describing the miss ile 
build - up in Cuba , Stevenson uses pathos by focusing on new 
dangers . He says : 
Tl1is once pcaceal>le island. i.s bei:;..5 trc:.nsfo r n ed 
into a formidable missil e ~nd str~ tes ic air base 
armed witi the de adl iest , far - raachine modern 
nuclear we3oons •• • qn d t he fuct re~alns t hat t b e 
Soviet i:.3.s ~1ps e t tne _i;rec :.rious ba l '1.nce ~:nd ere a ted 
a new :.trd d:J..nserou:J s it uat ion t;1 a new ar ea . 
Towar~ the end of his spoeca he a~ain r Galistl cally 
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points out the ~ravity of the entire situation . Cause for 
alarm i s s hown by specifi~s . 
W'nen tae Soviet Un ion sends thousands of Jlilita ry 
tecnn i c i ans to its ::rn.telli te in the \·re s tern aemispher e-
when it sends jet bombers ~2pa~ le of de l iverlnu nuclear 
weapo:ns--when l t ins t a lls in Cuo a :nissiles capable 
of carrying atomic warheads and of oblite~ating the 
:Panama Cr.:i.n"'l l , Mexico ~ity a nd Washington- -wh en it 
prepares sites f or a dd itional missi l es ~ith a range 
of 2 , 2()0 rni les ::ind a capacity to st riX.e n.t t :; r 5ets 
fr on Peru to iludson ' s Bay- wliell l t does these thinss 
un de r the cloak of s ecrecy and to the acco~pan iment 
of prei.1eciitat ed dec eption--when its actions ·-?.r e in 
fl~~rant violation of the policies of the Organization 
of Arneri8 an St:1tes and of the Ch3.rter o.f t !1e United 
Nations-this cle:J.rl y is :1 ti1re!.'lt t0 thi s hemispher e • 
.lnd when it taus up::;ets the }r ecarious bal ance in 
t he ~-Tor ld--i t ls o. threa t to the whole '.vorld . 
He g oes on to note a lso that ''. . . there has been no 
thre :?. t to t he vi sion of pea.Je so profound- no chal l eng e 
to the world of the Charter s o fa t eful ." 
He de~ls honestly with men when he states : 
We ho pe thQt Cha irman Khrushchev h~s not made a 
miscalc ulat ion , thd t he h~s not mista ken forb earance 
for weakness . We cannot j elieve th~t he has deluded 
himself i nto supposing th~t thou~h we hdVe power , 
we l=.i.c k ni:?rve; tha t , though we i1ave weapons , we a re 
without t he ~ill to use them . 
7 . Does the spa ech f~lse ly fl~tter men to their immedlate 
g ratifi·:ation 011t long term peril'/ 
Stevenson sug0e~;ts a .four point solution to the 
pro ;.,. le:!l. aLd , in so doln~ , he rn .-tices it cle a r that t1e i s 
not just interested in i~mediate 3 r atif i cation but in long-
term soluti ons . He s uggests a f a ce to face confrontation 
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with the Soviet Union •:1hich he fc;els may avoid future 
difficulties and thus avoid lone:~ terw ._)eri l . He says : 
Mr. Preside;:1t , I 3.m 3Ubrni ttin~; today a resolution 
to the Security 0ounc1.l de~;;it;n·2d to f'ind a way out of 
tnls calamltous situation. 
r his re solut ion calls, as an l.nterL11 measure 
under _trt ic le 40 o.i.' the Gh'.3..cter, fo.c the immed iate 
dis:nn..ntlin:S and withdr :.1wal fror.1 Cuba of a ll missiles 
and other o~fensive weapo~s . 
It further aut~orizes ~nd re~uests the ~ctlng 
Secretary General to dispatch to Cuba a United 
Nations observer corps to assure and re port on 
compliance with this r esolut ion . 
Upon UN certification of compllance , it calls 
for the termina tion of tae measures of !uarantine 
agalnst military shipments to Cub3 . 
lLnd, in conclusion , it urgen tly recommends that 
the United States of ~~erica and the Soviet Union 
confer promptly on measures to re~o~e the existing 
threat to the security of the ~estern Hemisphere and 
the peace of the world , and to report thereon to the 
Security Cou~~il . 
8 . Does the speech encourage respect fo r the spirit of 
free men "l 
The speaker no~es tha t the spirit of the Charter is 
in the spirit of free men . The Ambassador goes on to show 
that he not only helped write the United Nat i ons ' Charter 
seventeen years ago but also still remains loyal to its 
doctrines and principles . If one remains loyal to the U. N. 
Charter , he autocatically exprcss ~s a fa ith in the pluralistic 
world , a world of free choice whereby men respect the 
"infinite diversity of mank ind. " 3pea·1cing for himself 
and his. e;over:nment he notes : ". . • we welcomed the world 
of tne Charter for our society 1.s based upon principles 
- 54-
of choice and consent . " He goes on to say : 
We believe the principles of an open society in the 
wor l d order survive and flourish in the competitions 
of peace . We believe that freedom and diversity are 
the best climate for human creativity and social 
progress . 
The Speaker ' s Concept of Ideas 
Using Nilsen 's approach to analyzing and evaluating 
selected speeches one must also consider the speaker ' s 
concept of ideas . The critic ' s job is to determine if the 
ideas presented are used instrumentally or manipulatively. 
If ideas are us ed instrumentally the speaker is 
concerned with their validity and the creative social action 
. ' 
resulting from that validity. 
If ideas are used manipulatively they are instruments 
for contrivance, not validity. 
Nilsen ' s two major divisions follow. 
1. Are the ideas used instrumentally? 
Throughout the speech his ideas are used instrumentally . 
In discuss t ng the fo und i ng of the U. N. and the adoption 
of the U.N. Charter in 1945, Mr . Stevenson r eminds his 
audience that the Charter stresses a pluralistic world-
a world of choice . He states : 
The faith of the Charter is in a pluralistic world , 
a world of free choice, respecting the infinite 
diversity of mankind and dedicated to nations living 
together as good neighbors, in peace . 
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He goes on tnen to sho~v t h::.t t '.'lc Soviet Un i on and fifty - one 
other nati .Jus .:i.c;r eed to ::1:ute t his ~or:Hn j.ttmcn t. He proce eds 
t o show t h~t tae 3ov i e t Union ' 3 ph llosophy of a mono -
llthlc wo rld is di~Tctri c ally opposed to the U.1 . Charter . 
He ~sks : "Has the Soviet Union evar really joined the 
Unit ed Nat ions ? Or does its 9h ilosophy of hls tory and 
its conce pt ion of the future r un counter to t he plur a listic 
concept of tt1e Char t er?" iie then answers his rhe torical 
question by assert i ng: 
ABains t the idea of dive r s ity , Cor:lm u:n i sm asser ts 
the idea oI uniformity; a3ainst .fr eedom , inev itably ; 
aga i nst choic e , comp~lsion ; against democra cy , dosma ; 
agaL1s t independence , ideolor;y ; agg_l:1s t tolerance , 
conformity . 
He r 2inforcas his main i dea l~ter on in the speech 
wne~ he asserts t:1at tlw two pi:l lloso phies clas h and there -
fore caus e dissension wi.thin the U . i~ . He states : "The 
conflict between absolutist and pl ural i st ic conceptions of 
the destiny of mankind r emains the bas i c 3 o ~rce of discor d 
within the United Nati ons . '' 
Later l:n t he spe ech Mr. St evens on uses a gr eat de a l 
of ethical a9peal when he in itia lly l)ralses Hr . Khrushchev 
for altering many things in the Soviet Un ion . He then 
ab r uptly resta tes his mai n contention by saying : 
But there is one th i ng he has not altered~and that 
is t he basic drlve t o aboli sh the world of the Charter , 
to destroy the hope of a ;)lt.i.ralistlc wor l d order. 
He has not a lte r ed the basic drive to fulfill the 
prop~ecies of Mar x and Lenin and make the wor l d 
Communistic . 
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Finally he not2s that there is a ~orld civil war 
goir:.g on . I-iG sr::..y~; it i~-> "a contc :.: t between the pluralistic 
world a:ad tc~e monoli th:c world- -a corJte::;t bet•::een the 
world of the ·Jharte r ;_ud the world of Com::.1i;n ist confor mity . 11 
a) ~o tne ideas have a valid t~sis? 
.Hi.s rnai.r.. ideas revealed throue;ho u t tho address show 
(l)t t:e Untted St:_tte~.> bas r~mained fa i tbful 
to the United Nations ' azreerr:e!!t a.nd (2)the Soviet Union 
has , upon nu~erous occasions , violated tne Charter 
&greement . 
In order to prove his two main contenti ons Mr . 
3tevenson ~uotes ~n earlier ~tatement by President Kenne dy 
wno n~d provided h~stc i~format iun about the r ecen t military 
developmentJ e~isti~s in Cuba . Then he .soes on to compare 
t nese develo.rAnel1t::; witl1 thr:: i~eals cont:::.ined wi thln the 
l.J . ~ . Cn3.rter . Be -:.llo tes the Cha rter un<l notes : 
All :nembers saulJ. refrain in their inteTnatlon::il 
relations f rom the threat or use of force a~ains t 
t.ie territorlal intesr i ty or 7011.tical ir:dependence 
of any st~.te , or ir. · any ot(;.er murmer inconsl£:tent 
with tne purposes of the United Nations . 
Through his use of inductive r easoning Stevenson leads hls 
audience tc conclude~ tl1at , on ttis occasion t the Sovie t 
Union violated t~a U . ~ . agreemeat . 
Later i n tha sr:-~-: ech Steven son relies heavily upon 
s pee if ic ins t <-:::.nces to he 19 him prove tr.~:i. t tte .Sovie t 
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Union has on numerous occasions failed to abide by the 
Charter . He says that after WW II the : 
. . • Hed army was in occup2tion of Rumania , Bulgaria , 
Hungary , Poland , Eastern Germany and most of 
Czechoslovaki2. . And there the ited Army stayed . I t 
stayed in violation of the acrec~ent ... 
Mr . Stevenson de~ls with his first contention by 
reaffirmine his fai tl.i. and . the f''."":ii th of tne lJni ted State s 
in tne United Nations ' Charter . He identifies his 
audience with the s am e beliefs throu~h his continual use 
of such word s a'~ 11 ··'e r f 
.. .J •• ' ''v1e xnow ," an<l 11we ei.ave ." Said 
Steve1rnon , " de ,Q1ow -c t ... a t P- worl :J community Jf independent 
nations accepting a con:mon fr;.1r.ie o.f international orde r 
offers the oes t safBg ua rd for t~e s a f e t y of our shores and 
the security o1' our 1:·e op le . • f 
Relying on ethical proofs , he g oes on to show that 
the U. S . is COQmitted to the principles conta i ned in t he 
Charter . a~ Gays : •fl'ie remain committed to the pr i ncipl es 
of t11e Unite d Bat ions ' Charter , and ·we i~tend to defend 
tl1em . 11 St evenson points out also that the U. S . has a lway s 
remal ned loy al to t h e Ch a rter . iie i n terjects the following 
specifics in s upport : 
'Je have sou6nt loyally to support the United 
Nations , oe fait h ful to the world of the Chart er, 
and to build an operating system that acts , and doe s 
not t alk , for pea ce . 
We have never refused to negotiate . ~e have 
sat at conference after conference seeking peaceful 
solutions to menacing conflictD . 
We nave worked for general and complete disarmament 
5., - o -
under internat i onal superv ision . We h..:.t.ve tr ied 
earnestly and--'rJe won ' t stop trying--to react1 an 
a6reement to end ull nucle a r t eG ting . 
The United St a tes is not intere s ted ln self-
a ggr3.ndize!P.ent , s:;.ys 3tevE:n son , because .he notes we did 
not se i ze succ1 o.pportunities 2.f t er tc1e v1ar . ?he basis for 
this idea is f ound ln t ne factual il l us tra tion whlch 
f ollows . St evenson s t a tes : 
In 1945 , we were incomparably the greatest militar y 
po wer in t he world . Our troops and planes were 
dis;>e r sed cit strategic po ints a round. t he g lo be . We 
had e :x clusivc possess i on of the terror and promise 
of atomi c energy . Our economic streng th was unmatched. 
Restating t i:1e point l a te r on , 3tcvenson says , '1If the 
American purpo~e had be en world dominion , there could have 
been no more pr opi tuo us moment to set out on such a cour se . 0 
Proceedin!S deductiv ely , i1e then affirms that the 
United State s ls committed to the United Nat ions ' Char ter; 
specifics in support follow : 
. . • we dismantled t he mi ghties t military force we 
had ever a::;sembled . Armie s we re dis ·o.9.nded wholesale. 
Vast supplies of war e1uipment ·.ver e li quidated or 
junked . Within two years aft er t he end of t he war , 
our defense s pendin,i_: r,_a.d L:d.len b y nearly ~~70 billion . 
Our arme d forces were slashed f r om more than 12 m1111 on 
to one and a half million men . ~e did not reta in a 
singl e d i vision in a state of c ombat r ead iness . We 
did not have a sine;le miltt'.::l..ry a lli ance anywhere in 
tne wor ld . 
He fur ther develops his main id.e._ s tatistically : 
Instea d cf usin3 our ovc1 whelffiing economic 
strengtc1 to extend our nati onal po".ver , we contributed 
more t han $2 . 6 b illion to t he Un'i.te ~i ~:a t ions .ci.elief 
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and E.ehabilitation Administration , rnucL1 of which 
went to the r elief of suffering in the Communist 
countrtes . And d fte 1· 191+8 , we contributed many more 
billion~3 to the Bconoroic restoration of Europe--
and invited tne Communist countries to participate 
as reci pients of our ass~s tance . 
Instead of using our substance and strength to 
extend our nat i onal power , we support ed the movement 
for independence wnich began to sw0ep through Asia 
and Africa.--the movement which h d.s ::1dded 59 new members 
to the Unt ted Nations in the years si.nce 1945 . Since 
the war , we have contributed j g7 billion of economic 
and mil itary assistance to other nations ... 
The description of the Unj_ted States ' devotion to the 
U . ~ . introduces eth ical proof for the U. S . while negating 
ethical prouf for the Soviet Uni.on. The numer ous speclfics 
used establish tne validity of Stevenson's claims for the 
U.S. 
b). Does t he speech present ideas so tha t they take on 
added meaning ? 
Mr. Stevenso!'l concentra tes on e xpos ing Russia ' s 
role in the e x isting Cuban mi ssile crisis . He then 
discusses the actions taken by the U. S . since WW II whi c h 
demonstrate her sincerity to live up to the U. N. Charter. 
These two id.e ::-J S are c l early presented t: y the Ambassador 
through nis sKillful use of verbal supports , but the 
fact territory descri oed by Stevenson a lso gives some 
added meaning to the ~rob lem . He notes that the conflic t 
is not just a rift between two countries but instead is a 
problem for the entire world . Commenting on this 
I • 
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Stevenson declares: 
I regret that People here at the United Nations 
seem to believe that the Cold 1.•Jar is a private 
struggle between two great superpowers . It isn 't 
a private struggle; it is a world civil war- a 
contest between the pluralistic world and the monoli-
thic world •••• Every nation that is now independent 
and wants to remain independent is involved , whether 
they know it or not . Every nation is involved in this 
grim , costly, distasteful division in the world , no 
matter how remote and how uninterested . 
c) Do the ideas relate to other significant ideas , so 
that the listener can see the world a little more as 
a whole and can use his own intel ligence more effectively 
than before? 
The listener is able to see the entire world situation 
clearly because Mr . Stevenson uses : (l)factual illustrations, 
statistics and restatement to prove that the U. S. has 
been faithful to the U. N. Charter and (2)numerous specific 
instances , resta tements, statistics, explanations and 
factual illustrations to show that Russia has, upon numer ous 
occasions violated the U. N. agreement . 
To prove his first contention Stevenson recalls for 
his listeners the fact that the U. S. had great military 
strength after 'WW II yet failed to seek world dominion. 
Using inductive reasoning he implies that this example offers 
proof of our sinc erity to remain committed to the Charter . 
He concludes his point by expressing himself in the following 
manner : "History has not seen, I believe, a more complete 
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and comprehensive demonstration of a great nation ' s 
hope for peace and amity ." 
On the other hand Stevenson carefully illus trates 
that Russia continually betrays the U. N. agreement . 
Using numerous specific instances he makes his point clear. 
He takes his listeners back to l945, strengthens his ethos 
by noting his presence on tha t historic occasion, and 
points out: 
The very first meeting of the Secur i ty Council---and . 
I was there--was called to hear a complaint by Iran 
that t he Soviet troops had failed to withdraw 
from the northern part of that country on the date 
on which they had agreed to leave . Not only had they 
declined to go ; they had installed a puppet regime 
on Iranian soil and had blocked Iranian ·troops from 
entering part of I ran ' s t erritory . The Soviet 
Union, in short, was violating the territorial 
integrity a nd d enying the political independence of 
Iran----and doing so by armed force . 
Stevenson uses other examples which prov e Russia ' s 
continual violation of the agr eement . He cites specific 
instances in Rumania , Bulgaria , Hungary, Poland, Easter n 
Germany , Czechoslovakia, Greece, Turkey , Malaya , the 
Philippines , Burma , Indo- China and other places as well . 
In a restatement he notes : 
In one event after another , on one stage after another---
the rejection i n the United Nations of the American 
plan for the internationalization of atomic energy, 
the r e j ection of the Marshal Plan , the blockade of 
Berlin and , finally , the inva sion of South Korea---
The Soviet Union assailed political independence, 
resisted the world of the Charter and tried to impose 
its design of a communist future . 
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Pressing his point futher he relies upon more 
specific instances , testimonies , statistics , and restatements . 
He says : 
At Potsdam it the Soviet government promised 
that 11 all democratic political parties with rights . 
of assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed 
and encouraged throughout Germany"-and within its 
own zone promptly repudiated that promise . At Geneva 
in 1954 it agreed not to introduce arms into Vietn=a~m __ _ 
and sent guns and ammunition to the Viet Minh. 
It denounced nuclear testing---and then violat ed 
the moratorium ·which for three years had spared the 
world of the danger of nuclear tests . · 
Within this Council , it has thwarted the 
majority will 100 times by the use of the veto . 
The record is clear: treaties , agreements , 
pledges and the morals of international relations 
were never an obstacle to the Soviet Union ••• 
He concludes his point by inductively implying that Rus s i a 
will consistently disregard the Charter agreement unles s 
an effort is made to halt the expansion of communism . 
In order that the listener might further view t he 
world situation a little more as a whole the speaker then 
presents a factual illustration to explain exactly what 
took place in Cuba prior to the missile build- up . He 
r eflects back to 1959 and discusses the revolution which 
took place on the island of Cuba. He explains that 
Dr . Castro promised the people of Cuba the restoration of 
the 1940 constituti on, and general elections held within 
a period of no more than a year . Castro had promised 
11 truly honest" elections with freedom of information and 
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political activity . He points out that the Cuban people 
accepted Dr . Castro ' s promises . He reviews , however , 
exactly what happened in Cuba • 
• • • A grim struggle took place within the revolu-
tionary regime, between its democratic and its 
predominant Communist wings~between those who over-
threw Batista to bring freedom to Cuba, and those who 
overthrew Batista to bring Cuba to Communism . In a few 
months the struggle was over . Brave men who had 
fought with Castro in the Sierra Maestra and who had 
or ganized the underground against Batista in t he 
cities were assailed , arrested , and driven from 
office into prison or exile, ••• By the end of 
1959, the Communist Party was the only party in Cuba 
permitted freedom of political action. By early 1960 , 
the Castro regime was entering into intimate economic 
and political relations with the Soviet Union . 
Stevenson goes on to show his listeners what happened 
after the revolution. He says : 
In the year and a half since , Dr . Castro has 
continued the communization of his unfortunate country. 
The 1940 constitution was never restored. Elections 
were never held and their promise withdrawn----though 
Dr . Castro ' s twelve months have stretched to forty-
two . The Castro regime fasteneo on Cuba an iron 
system of repression . It eradicated human and civil 
rights . It openly transformed Cuba into a Communis t 
satellite and police state . Whatever benefit this 
regime might have brought to Cuba has long since been 
cancell ed out by the firing squads , the drumhead 
executions , the hunger and misery , the suppression 
of civil and political and cultural freedom . 
The factual backgrou~d of the missile cr isis , the 
advent of the United Nations, the devotion of the U. S. to 
the purposes of the U.N. , and the activities of the U. S. 
since World War II, all paint a vivid word picture for 
the listeners . 
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Thomas Nilsen a l s o not es that some speakers use 
ideas ln a man ipula tive manner . His second quest ion 
r egarding the speaker ' s ideas t s ~s follows : 
2 . Are the ideas used manipulative ly? 
Stevenson does not a void critical appraisal and 
perpetuate narrow meanings . Therefore he does not use 
h is ideas man ipula tively in u so:;Jhistic tr:J.d ition . 
rhe Speaker 's Conce pt of Society 
Now let us see h ow well S t evenson measures up to 
the f ollowing que s tions aboJt soc iety posed by Nilsen : 
1 . What is the speaker ' s concept of soci..ety? 
Throughout ~c . Stevenson' s ent ire address he maintai ns 
the ph~losophy that s ociety as 3 whole will progress , 
flourish c.nd survive only i f nat ions mal:~e every possible 
effort to n pho l d ti'ie nigh ideals set forth in tae United 
Nations ' Charter . ffe q uote s from the Charter upon ntL'Tierous 
occasions and stresses the idea that t~e f ifty- one nations 
who signed t he Char~er did so because the Charter 11 ••• holds 
out to hwnan ity the br i ght h o pe of a n ew world- -a world 
securely founded in international peace , i n national 
independence , in personal freedom , in respect for law, 
f or social justice and betterment . . II He not e s that 
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it ls wrouc; for nat·io.nr> to im:.>O !·~e or tnflict their way 
o.f life upon others for he s ays that- · he-. dqubts " . . • 
-. 
whether an y nation has so absolute a gri? on absolute truth 
that it is entitled to ~mpose its idea of what is rtght 
.on others . " Ins tead , the ~ . s . Ambassador mainta.lns 
people should try to A.dhere to the Ohartcn~--which str esses 
freedom and di.versity- -and t hereby make eve r y effort 
possible to keep int ernational peace . 
He imp l les that, even. though countries ha:Je different 
basic phi l osopnies and f orms of government they can st ill 
live together ln harmony if they keep i n mind the t hought 
that the world i s a '' .•. com~un ity ~f independent nations , 
eacll freel.l devel'.)plng a ccording to it3 ow1: traditions 
and its Oim _3 e n ius , oound togeti1er by a cor::i:non respe.ct 
for t he rights of other nations and by a loyalty to the 
larger i nternati::mal :1rder . 11 
2 . dh:i t does t i1e speec:1 i m-ply ab out r i::ltlonality, tolerance , 
and t he moral autonomy of the indlvidu~l? 
Although Stevenson impli es tha t moral autonomy of 
the individua l is i mportant he deals primar ily wlth the 
i ndividual tolerance and autonomy of nations . Throughout 
the whole spa ech Stevenson stresses the idea t hat indtv idual 
countries iaus t make ever y effo.rt to uphold the Ch-arter if 
the entire world order i s to survive . He notes that nations 
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must be tolerant and rationnl if they intend to make the 
supreme effort to abide by the Charter. Using specific 
instances Stevenson points out that the U.S . has repeatedly 
remained tolerant of the Soviet Union's aggressive actions . 
He says: 
We have declined to be provoked into actions 
which might lead to war- in face of such challenges 
as the Berlin blockade, such affronts to humanity as 
the repression of the Hungarian revolt, such atrocities 
as the erection of that shameful wall to fence in the 
East Germans who had fled to the West in such vast 
multitudes . 
Stevenson also implies throughout his speech that 
nations must be rational in their behavior toward others . 
When discussing the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, he 
observes that nations should be both tolerant and rational 
in order for society to benefit . Establishing ethical 
proof he notes in his example that the U.S . gave aid to 
the Cuban revolutionaries but stopped short of direct 
intervention. He notes : 
The people and government of the United States 
sympathized with these men [Cuban revolutionaries] 
~as throughout our history Americans have always 
sympathized with those who sought to liberate their 
native lands from despotism . I have no apologies to 
make for that sympathy, or for the assistance which 
these brave Cuban refugees received from our hands . 
But I would point out , too , that my government , still 
forbearing , refrained from direct intervention. It 
sent no American troops to Cuba . 
2 . What does the speech imply about the expression of 
opinions, deliberation, persuasion , free inquiry , 
' 
I 
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free criticlsM, ~nd free choice? 
The Ambassador implies th:i.t nations could avoid 
major conflicts if they adhered to the U. N. agreement . 
'file agree;,1ent , he reminds his listeners , stresses the 
polnt th~t nati~ns should have the freedom to choose the 
form and type of government they wish . Therefore 
Stevenson remains comnitted to the idea that freedoo of 
choice is good for the growth and pro~ress of society . 
Stevenson likewise notes that it is important to 
deliberate on points of differences in the sincere hope 
that problems may be minimized or dissolved through this 
means . tleafflrmins his fqith in t~e process of delibe r ation 
Stevenson points out that the u. ::; . government has called 
for a meeting of the Organ of Consultation of the 
Organizati~n of the American .States and presented tne 
missile prob lem to them . He notes that the results of 
their deliberattons wi l l soon be available to his aud ience 
and he ur.::;es them to comply wit'a their recommendations in 
the intere at of world peace . Stevenson then implies in 
his appeal for peace that del i b eration o~ problems is of 
the utmost importa.:.1ce to society 1nd he furtherrilore 
strengthens his stand by submitting hls own problem to the 
process of open deliberation . 
3 . What does the speech irr.ply about discussion and debate , 
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the use of inform~tion , the interchang e of ideas , the 
functl on of oppos iti on and a ttitudes toward wha t is 
orthodox a nd unort~odo~ in t h ou3 ht an1 ~ction? 
In his address the U. S . Ambassador implies that nations 
saould exchange ide as and freely discuss their diffe r ences . 
'fh i s fact is made clea r by :·1r . Stevenson when , in his prop osal 
for peace, he suggests t~at re presentat i ves from t he S ov i et 
Union a nd the united State s confer in order "GO r emove the 
'' • •• e x i stine; threat to the s ecurity of the Western 
Hemisphere • • • " 
3tevenson a l s o im?lies in h i s speech that it is impor tant 
to the progress of world peace f or nations to ac t i n an 
orthodo x m~nner as o ~posed to a n unorthodox manne r . Stevenson 
implies th~t the world situation is ln its current state of 
d iscord because of the Sovi et Union ' s unorthod ox behavior . 
Using causal reasoning and an e xp lana t ion he ci t es the 
f ollowing exa~ple of unor thodox behavior on the part of the 
Sov iet Uni.on . Ee declar es : 
The conflict between absolut i st and plural i st ic 
conceptions of the destiny of m~nkind remains the 
source of d iscord within the United ~at ions . I t has 
g iven rise to what is know:i as t h e Cold 1var . ~Te re 
it not for this conflict t~i s Or g3n i zation would have 
ma de ste ady proeress t oward the world of choic e and 
justice envisaged a t San ?.c:inc is co . 
J ut be c ause of the S0vlet rejection of an open 
wor l d , the hope fo r progr ess ~nd for peace has been 
systematically frustrated . And in tnese h a lls we 
spend much of our time and ene r gy eitae r engaged in 
or avoiding thi s incessant conflict . 
He i mplles here that it i s un orthodox beha vior on the 
par t of the Soviet Union to hamper world progress and he 
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notes tha t it restricts the United Nations from accomplishing 
her proposed goals . 
Stevenson cites still another example of unorthodox 
behavior from the Soviet Union when he notes that they 
deny the truth . He quotes the Sovi et Government as 
saying: ' ~he armaments and military equipment sent to 
Cuba are designed exclusively for defense pur poses .' 
He cites sever al other times that stat ements were made 
by the Soviet Government accrediting the missiles to 
defensive purposes . Stevens on goes on to show th i s is 
qui te unlikely. He says : " In the Soviet lexicon evidently 
all weapons are pur ely defensive, even weapons that can 
strike from 1 , 000 t o 2,000 miles away. " He implies here 
again the unorthodox measures used by the Soviet Union 
to get the missiles into Cuba by publicly declaring 
that the missiles were purely for defense purposes . 
The Ambassador implies that some ac t i ons and 
thoughts are orthodox and t her efore all right to be used 
when dealing with other nations . He does not s ay 
though that it is permissible for one country to use 
unorthodox means to a cquire what they want, and he 
implies tha t if this happens it could be detr imental to 
society as a whole . 
Mr . Stevenson lends strength to this argument 
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again later in his sp r:ech when he compares the Soviet 
missiles in Cuba with the NATO missiles dispersed 
strategically around the world . In his example he shows 
that the NATO missiles were placed throughout the world 
in a manner consistent with the principles of the U. N. 
Charter while the Soviet missiles in Cuba were not . He 
compares the two s ituations in the following way. 
Missiles which help a country defend its independence---
which leave the political institutions of the recipient 
countries intact---which are not desi8ned to subvert 
the territorial integrity or political independence 
of other states- which are installed without concealment 
or deceit----assistance in this form and with these 
pur poses is consistent with the principles of the 
United Nations . But missiles which introduce a 
nuclear threat into an area now free of it- which 
threaten the security and independence of defenseless 
neighboring states~which are installed by clandestine 
means~which result i n the most fo rmidable nuclear 
base in the world outside existing treaty systems ••• 
is radically different . 
In a restatement Stevenson finally concludes in the 
following manner . "There is , in short , a vast difference 
between the long- range missile sites established years ago 
in Europe and the long- range missile sites established by 
the Soviet Union in Cuba during the last three months ." 
Using this illustration then Stevenson makes his point 
clear that some actions are carried out in an orthodox manner 
and thereby all r ight while others are carried out in an 
unorthodox fashion . He implies that unorthodox actions 
threaten the security of the entire world and thereby should 
be avoided at all possible costs . 
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Conclusion 
This chapter was designed to present an analysis 
and evaluat i on of Mr . Adlai E. Stevenson ' s United Nations 
address which he delivered to the U. N .. Security Council 
on October 23 , 1962 , in the interest of world peace . 
Mr . Stevenson's ideas were examined as far as they expressed 
his philosophy of man , ideas and society . Thomas R. Nilsen's 
approach to speech criticism was applied to the address in 
the hope that the writer might discover not only what the 
speaker directly intended but also ·what he indirectly 
implied for his listeners . Conclusions are pinpointed in 
the chapter which follows . 
CHAPT1t.;R V 
Sur!llTia ry and Conclusions 
Sununn.ry 
The purpose of this study was to Rnalyze and evaluate 
Mr . Adlai E. Stevenson ' s speech of October 23 , 1962, 
·which was delivered to the United l'fa.tions ' Security 
Council dur ing the Cuban missile cris is . In order to 
anal yze the speech ·properly it was i mper at::..ve to examine 
t he speaker ' s earl:r upbr ingine and note his a ccompl ishments 
as a political personal ity and Unit ed Nat ions ' st~tesman . 
Special considerat i on was also r.;iven t o the events leading 
up to the Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961 and the Cuban missile 
crisis of 1962 , in the hope that t he historical information 
would give. the writer a better· perspecti ve for the speech 
·analysis . 
The cri teric::. by which the speech was analyzed was 
abstracted from Thomas R. Nils en 's '' The Interpretive 
Function of the Critic." Nilsen notes in qis article that 
11 R vital function of speech criticism should be to interpret 
the meaning of speeches, not in the sense of clarifying 
wh8.t the speaker directly intends but in the sense of what 
the speech indirectly implies ••• " Nilsen later points out 
- 72-
- 73-
that the interpretative critic is not just interested in 
identifying and reporting the rhetorical techniques but 
in discovering what the speech reflects about the speaker ' s 
concepts of man , ideas, and society. 
This study , therefore , focused on three basic questions 
raised by Nilsen. They are as follows : 
1 . \"H1at is the speaker ' s concept of man? 
2 . What is the speaker ' s concept of ideas? 
3 . ~rfha t is the speaker ' s concept of society? 
To aid the analysis the speaker ' s verbal supports , persuasive 
proofs , and language usage were also observed . 
i'Jhen the writer examined Mr . Stevenson's speech in 
light of Mr . Nils en's first criterion the following concepts 
of man were discovered . 
1 . Man is a being of intrinsic worth . 
2 . Man should be free to make his own decision . 
3. Man is a be ing with a ca pacity for wisdom and rational 
choice . 
4. Man is capable of making both wise and unwise decisions . 
5. Man should not willfully impose his ideas upon others . 
6 . Man is, at present , f a ced with an alarming situation . 
7. Man appreciates a refined and cogent rhetoric . 
8. Man is obligated to produce a refined rhetoric . 
9. Man is able to avoid destruction . 
The following concepts of ideas were also discovered . 
1 . The U. N. Charter acknowleges a pluralistic world . 
2 . Tho United States has always remained true to the 
United Nations ' Charter . 
3. The Soviet Union believes in a monolithic world. 
4. The Soviet Union ha s viola t ed the U. N. Charter and 
will continue to do so . 
The writer also discovered the following concepts 
of socie ty by applying the third auestion. 
1 . The world is large enough to shelter a great 
va riet y of economic systems , political creeds , 
philosophical beliefs , and reli~ious convictions . 
2 . Society will benefit i f all nations remain tolerant 
of other viewpoints, discuss their differences 
in a rat ional manner, exchan~e ideas freely and 
pr actice orthodox behavior . 
3. Society will f lourish and survive only if nations 
make every possible effort to fulfill their 
United Nations ' agreement and uphold t he high 
ideals set forth in t he U. N. Charter . 
Y· . Society is threatened because the Soviet Union 
has violated the U. N. agreement . 
5. The future of the i:mrld depends upon the decision 
of the Security Council regardine the impending 
disas ter . 
These concents of man , ideas and society were 
artistically developed t hroughout the entire address thr ough 
l 1!r . Stevenson ' s continual use of numerous verbal supports . 
He relied heavily upon factual illustrations , specific 
jnstances , explanations , testimonies , restatements and 
statistics to prove to his listeners that the United States 
has rema in ed true to her Unit ed !'Iations 1 commitment while 
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the Soviet Union has not . He explained to his listeners 
t hat even after ;_,Jorl<l vfar II the United St ates r emained 
loyal to the Charter instead of seeking world dominion. 
Then he proceeded to show how tolerant the U. S . r emained 
townrd the Soviet government even thouph they repeatedly 
violated the United Nations ' Charter agreenent . Stevenson 
emphnsized the f act that the Soviet government f a iled to 
comply wjth the u . 1~ . Rgreement . To support this , he cited 
the fact tha t the ~ussian leaders hnd signed non- aggression 
treaties with the Baltic States and Finland and had later 
willfully broken t hese agreements . To further s upport his 
charges he chRrged t he Soviets with U. N. Charter violations 
in Malaya , the Philippines, 13urma , Inda- China , Germany , 
Ifungary and Cuba . He used statistics to note also that 
the Soviet government thwarted t he maj ority will one 
hundred t i.mes by thG use of the ve to and , in doing so, 
hampered the efficiency of the United Nations organization . 
These numerous verbal supports a ided Stevenson 
throughou t hjs address because t hey pres ented f acts clearly 
and enabled his audience to perceive the world situation 
more objectively ana ther eby make a more r es ponsible 
decision. 
His selected language a lso helped his audience percei ve 
t he situri.t i.on more clearl~r . He us ed a great deal of imagery 
and repetition of key wor ds and ph r nses . He a lso made 
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skillful use of the cataplexis , climax and per oration and 
thereby crented a wide variety of symbolism for his audience . 
Through his continual use of pathos he explained 
that the s ituation ·wHs extremely dangerous for societ y 
as ,q wh.ole but, at the S;;3.me time , he stressed the idea 
th:=t t there w;:i.s :::i. wny ou t of the co.lo.mi to us situation . 
He offered his oi..,rn four point plnn to allevi a t e t he existing 
threat to world peace , and he urgently requested the Counci l 
to seek the advice of the Organization of American Sta tes . 
He painted a vivid word picture for his audience and 
emphasized to them that they hnd the responsibility of 
makine a decision on the matter that would indeed affect 
the entire world . He concluded his plea for peace by 
stating to the Council t hat 11 ••• there is a road t o pea ce . 11 
He then challenged his audience to ei t :1er adopt his four 
point r esolution or heed the advice of the Organi za tion of 
American States and take a fi r m stand against t he Soviet 
government in the inter est of world peace. 
Conclusions 
The Nilsen criteri a for speech evaluation was appl i ed 
to this address by Ambassador Stevenson because it of fered 
a unique approach to speech criticism. Instead of dicta ting 
rigid guidelines to by fol l owed , the Ni l sen criter ia allows 
a philosophical perspective and treats the analys is and 
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evaluation as one entity r ather th~n as separated categories . 
The criteria. vas specifi_cHlly useful when applied 
to Stevenson ' s sneech . It is assumed , therefore , that 
an application of the same criteria to other speeches given 
during a crisis situation would produce eoually valid criticism. 
After completing the speech e valuat ion and analysis 
the writer would like to recommend that other speeches by 
Ambn.ssador Adlai E. Stevenson which ·were delivered during 
other international crises be studied and perhaps it would 
be wise to s tua~, the speeches of l<r . Stevenson 1 s opponents 
and examine them in light of their philosophy of man, i deas 
and society. 
APPENDI :C A 
THF. SPEECH OF OCTOBER 23 , 1962 
by Ambassador Adlai Stevenson 
I have asked for an emergency me eting of the Security 
Council to bring to your attention a grave threat to 
the Western Hemisphere and to the peace of the world . _ 
Last night the President of the United States reported 
the recent alarming military developments i n Cuba. Per mit 
me to remind you of the President ' s sobering words : 
Within the past week unmi stakable evidence has 
established the fact that a series of offensive 
mi ssil e sites is now in preparation on that 
imprisoned isl and . The purpose of these bases can 
be none other than to pr ovide a nuclear strike 
capability aga inst the Western Hemispher e . 
Upon rec e iving the first preliminary ha r d 
information of this nature last Tuesday morning 
October 16 at 9 : 00 A. M. , I directed that our 
surveillance be stepped up . And having now confirmed 
and completed our evaluation of the evidence and our 
decision on a course of action, this Government feels 
obliged to report this new crisis to you in ful l es t 
detail . 
The characteristics of these new mis sile sit es 
i ndicate two distinct types of installations . Several 
of them include medium r ange ballistic missiles , 
capable of carryin g a nuclear warhead for a distanc e 
of more than 1,000 nautical miles . Each of these 
missiles , in short , i s capable of str iking Washington, 
D.c., the Panama Canal , Cape Canaveral, Mexico City , 
or any other c i ty in the Southeastern part of t he 
United States , in Central America or in the Caribbean 
area . 
Additional sites not yet completed appear to 
be designed for intermediate range ballistic missiles---
capabl e of travelling more than twice as far ---and 
thus capable of striking most of the major cities in 
the Western Hemisphere , ranging as far north as 
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Hudson ' s Bay , Canada, and as far south as Lima, Peru . 
In addition , jet bombers, capable of carrying nuclear 
weapons, are now being uncrated and assembled in Cuba, 
while t he necessary air bases are be ing prepared . 
In view of this transformation of Cuba into a base 
for offensive weapons of sudden mass destruction, the 
President announced the ini tj_atlon of a strict quarantine 
on nll offensive military weapons under shipment to 
Cubn . He did so because , in the view of my Government, 
the recent developments in Cuba- --the importation of the 
Cold War into the heart of the Americas---constitute a 
threat to the peace of this hemisphere , and, indeed , 
to the peace of the world . 
II 
Mr . President , seventeen years ago the representatives 
of fifty- one nations gathered in San Francisco to adopt 
the Charter of the United Nations. These nations stat ed 
with clarity and eloquence the high purpose which brought 
them together . 
They announced their common determination " to save 
succeeding generations from the scourage of war ••• t o 
reaffirm f aith in fundamental human rights ••• to establish 
conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations 
arising from treaties and other sources of international 
law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and 
better standards of life in larger fr eedom ." And i n one 
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sentence, Paragraph 4, Article 2 , they defined the necessary 
condition of a community of independent peoples : 
"All members shall r efrain in their internati_onal 
relations from t he threat or use of fo rc e against 
the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state , or in any other manner i nconsistent 
·with the Purposes of the United Wat ions . " 
In this spi r it , these fifty- one nations solemnly 
resolved to band together in a great cooperative quest 
for world peace and world progress . The adventure of 
the United Nations held out to humanity the bright hope 
of a new Horld---a world securely founded in international 
peace , in national independence, in personal freedom , in 
respect for law , for soc ial justice and betterment, and, 
in the words of the Charter, for "equal rights and self-
determination of peoples ." 
The vision of San Francisco was the vision of a 
world community of independent nations , each freely develping 
according to its own traditions and its own genious, bound 
together by a common respect for the rights of other nations 
and by a common loyal ty to the larger international order . 
This vision assumes that t his earth is quit e large enough 
to shelter a great variety of economic systems , political 
creeds, philosophical beliefs and rel ir,ious convictions . 
The faith of t he Cha.rt er is in a plur alistic world, a 
world of f ree choic e , res pec ting the infinite diversity 
of mankind and dedicated to nations living together as 
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good nei r,hbors, i n peace . 
Like many peoples , we welcomed t he world of the 
Charter for our socie ty i s based on principles of choice 
and consent . 
We bel ieve the principles of an open society in 
the world order s urvi ve and flourish in the competitions 
of peace . We believe that freedom and diversity are 
the best clima te for human creativity anrl social progress. 
We reject all fatalistic philosophies of history and all 
theories of pol i tical and social predestination . We 
doubt whether any nation has so absolute a grip on 
absolute tru t h t hat it is entitled to impose its idea of 
what is right on others . And ·we know t hat a world 
community of i ndependent nations a ccepting a common 
frame of international order offers the bes t safeguard 
for the safet~r of our shores and the security of our people . 
Our commitment to the world of the Charter expresses both 
our deepest philosophical traditions and the most realistic 
inter pretation of our national interes t. 
III 
Had we any other vis ion of the world , had we sought 
the path of empire , our opportunities for self- aggrand izement 
immediately af ter the war were almost unparalleled . In 1945, 
we were incomparably the greatest military power in the world . 
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Our troops and planes were dis persed a t strategic points 
around the ~lobe . 1fe had exclusive possession of the 
terror and promise of atomic energy . Our economic strength 
'l.·.ras unmR tched . If the American purpose had been world 
dominion , there could have been no more prop~tious moment 
to s0t out on s uch a course. 
Instead, our commitment, then as now, was to the 
world of thG Charter--- the creation of a community of 
freely cooperating i ndependent states bound together 
by the Unit ed Nation . In the service of this commitment, 
and without waiting for the peace treaties, we dismantled 
the mightiest mil i tary forc e we had ever assembled . Armies 
were disbanded wholesale. Vast supplies of war equipment 
were liquidated or junked . Within two years after the 
end of the war, our d efense spend i ng had fallen by nearly 
$70 billion . Our armed forces were slashed from more 
than 12 million to one and a half million men . We did not 
r etain a s ingle division in a state of combat readiness. We 
did not have a single military alliance anywhere in the 
world . :~is tory ha s not s een , I believe , a more complete 
and comprehensive demonstration of a great nation ' s hope 
for peace and amity . 
Instead of using our mono poly of atonic energy to 
extend our national power > we offered in 1946 to transfer 
the control of a tomic ener gy to the United Nations . 
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Instead of using our overwhelming economic str ength 
to extend our national power , we contributed more than $2 . 6 
billion to the United Hations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration, much of which went to the relief of suffering 
in the Communist countries . And after 1943 , we contr i buted 
many more billions to the economic restoration of Europe---
and invi tcd the Com:;1unis t countries to no.rticipate as 
recipients of our assistance . 
Instead of us ing our substa~ce and strength to extend 
our national power , we supported the movement for independenc e 
which began to sueep throuf:h Asia. and A:frica---the movement 
which has ndded 59 ne'·i members to the Un:L ted Nations in 
the years since 1945. Since the war, we have contribut ed 
$97 billion of econ~mic and military assistance to other 
nations---and , f -'-1 • o 1..ni s sam , $53 billion has gone to t h e 
nations of ~sia , Africa , and Latin America . 
I have often , .. mndered '!!hat the world would be l ike 
today if the si tuatj_on at the end of the war had been 
reversed- - - if the United States had been ravaged and 
shattered by war , and if the Soviet Union had emerged i ntac t 
in exclusive possession of the atomic bomb and overwhelmi ng 
military and e conomic might . Would it have followed t he 
same path and devoted itself to realizing the world of 
the Charter? 
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IV 
To ask this ques tion suggests the central paradox 
of the United N::itions . For n.mong the states which pledged 
their fidelj_ty t o t il e idea of n. pluralistj_c world in San 
Francisco were some who had a.n incompatible vision of the 
future world order . 
Has the Soviet Union ever reall;; .joj_ned the United 
Nations? Or does its philosophy of history and its 
conception of the future run counter to the pluralistic 
concept of the Charter? 
Agains t the idea of diversity , CommWlism asserts 
the idea of uniformity ; against freedom , inevitably; 
aeainst choice , compulsion; a gainst democracy, dogma ; 
against independence, ideology ; asainst tolerance , con-
formity . Its faith is that the iron laws of history will 
requir e every nation to traverse the same uredestined path 
to the same predestined conclusion . Given this faith in 
a monolithic world, the very existenc e of diversity is 
a threat to the Communist future . 
I do not assert that Communism must always remain 
a messianic faith . Like other fanaticisms of the past , 
it may in time lose its sens e of infallibility and accept 
the divers i ty of human destiny. Already in some countr ies 
we see Communism subs iding into a local and limited ideology . 
There are those who have discerned the same evolution in 
the Soviet Union its elf ; and we may all earnestly hope 
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that Chairman Khrushchev and hi s associates will renounce 
the dream of makinz the world over in the image of the 
Soviet Union . It Must be the pnrpose of other nations 
to do what they can to hasten t hat day . 
But that day has not yet arrived . The conflict 
between absolutist and pluralistic conceptions of the 
dest i ny of manki nd remains the basic source of discord 
within the United Nations . It has given rise to what is 
known as the Cold ·.#tr . 1.1Iere it not for th i s conflict , 
t his Organi zat ion would have made steady progress toward 
the world of choice and justice envisaged at San Francisco . 
But because of the Soviet rejec t l on of an open 
world , t he hope for progress a nd for peace has been 
systematically frustrated . And in these halls we spend 
much of our time and energy either engaged in or avoiding 
this incessant confl i ct . 
It began even before the nations gathered at San 
Francisco . As so8n as the defeat of the Nazis appeared 
certain, the Soviet Union began to abandon the policy of 
war-time cooperation to which it had turned for self-
protection . In early 1945, Mos cow instructed the communist 
parties of the West to purge t hemselves of the sin of 
cooperation , and to return to their prewar view that 
democratic governments were by def i nition imperialistic 
and wicked . Within a few weeks after the meeting at Yalta , 
the Soviet Union took swift action in Rumania and Poland 
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in brutal violation of the Yalta pledges of political freedom . 
At the same time, it bc8an a polit ical offens ive 
aeains t the United Stntes , charging that the American 
government--- the government of Franklin Roosevelt---was 
eneaged in secret peace negotiations with Hitler . Roosevelt 
replied to Stalin tha t he deepl y resented these "vile 
misrepresentations ." At the end of March 1945 , Roosevelt 
ca bled 'Ai ns ton Churchill th.at he was 11 ·wa tching with anxiety 
and concern the development of the Soviet attitude" and 
that he was "acutel:r a':m.re of the dangers inherent in the 
present cours e of events , not only for immediate issue 
but also the San Fr~ncisco Conference and future world 
cooperation ." 
It .is import~nt to rec~ll these facts , because the 
Soviet Union has tried j_n the years since to pre tend that 
its policy of aggression was a defensive response to the 
change of administration in the United States, or to Churchill's 
1946 speech at Fulton , Mi;souri , or to some other event 
after the death of Roosevelt . But the historical record 
is clear. As soon us the Soviet government saw no further 
military need for the war - tj_me coalition , it set out on its 
expansionist adventures . 
The ink was hardly dry on the Charter before Moscow 
began its war against the world of the United Nations . 
The very first meeting of the Security Council---and I was 
there---was called to hear a complaint by Iran that the 
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Soviet troops had fai l ed to withdraw from the northern 
part of that country on the date on which they had agreed 
to l eave . Not only had they declined to go ; they had 
installed a puppet regime on Iranian soil and had blocked 
Iranian troops fro~ en t e ring part of I r an ' s territory. The 
Soviet Union , in short , was vi olating the territorial 
integrity and denying the political independence of Iran---
and doing so by armed forc e . Eventually the United Nations 
forced a reluctant a greement from the Soviet Union to live 
up to its pledge . 
This was only the beginning . At the time of the 
German surrender , t he -:ied Army was i n occupation of 
Rumania , Bulgaria , Hungary, Poland, Eastern Germa ny and 
most of Czechoslovakia . And there the Red Army stayed . 
It stayed in violation of the Qgreement reached at Yalta 
by the heads of the allied powers --- t he agreement which 
pledged the independence and promis ed free elections to 
these nations . By 1948 , fi ve nations and half of a sixth, 
with a combined population of more than 90 million people, 
had been absorbed into the communist empire . To this day 
the peoples of Eastern Europe have neve r been permitted 
to exe rcise the Charter right of s elf - determination . 
Before the suppression of Eastern Europe was complete, 
the Soviet Union was fomenting guerrilla warfare and 
sabotaging economic recovery---in Greece and Turkey---
assailing neiehboring regimes through all the instrumentalities 
- 89-
of propaeanda and subversion . 
Nor were such acti vi tics confined to ~~urope . In 
Malaya---in the Philippines---in Burma--- in Inda- China 
the communists encouraged and supported guerrilla upris ings 
against constituted governments . 
In one event afte r another , on one stage after 
another---the reject i on i n the United Nations of the 
American plan for the internationalization of atomic energy , 
the r ejection of the lfurshal Plan, the blockade of Berlin 
and , finally , the invasion of South Korea---the Soviet Union 
assailed poli tical independence , resisted the world of the 
Charter and tried to.impose its design of a communist future . 
Let me recall to this Council, Mr . President , the 
record with regard to international a~reements . 
The Soviet government has signed treaties of non-
aggression , as it did with the Baltic states and Finland---
and then systematically invaded the countries whose 
integrity it h~d solemnly promised to respect . 
At Yal t a and i n a succession of peace treaties, it 
pledged to the liberated countries of Eastern Europe 
" the right of all peoples to choose the form of government 
under which they will live---the restoration of sovereign 
rights and self- government to those peoples who have been 
forcibly deprived of them"---and then it systematically 
denied those rights and consolidated that deprivation . 
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In 1945 it signed a thirty- year pact of mutual 
assistanc G and non- aggression with China , pledging that 
its military aid and economic support would be " given 
entirely to the National Government as the Central Govern-
ment of China"---and violated tha.t treaty almost before 
the Chinese negotiators had left Moscow. 
At Potsdam it promised that "all democr at i c political 
parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion 
shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany11 ---
and within its own zone promptly repudiated that promise . 
At Geneva i n 1954 it agreed not to introduce arms into 
Vietnam---and sent guns and ammunition to the Viet Minh . 
It denounced nuclear testing---and then violated 
the moratorium which for three years had spared the worl d 
of the danger of nuclear tests . 
Within this Council, it has thwarted the majority 
will 100 times by the use of the veto . 
The record is clear : treaties , a greements , pledges 
and the morals of international relations were never an 
obstacle to the Soviet Union under Stalin . No one has 
said so more el oquently than Chairman Khrushchev . 
VI 
With the death of Stalin in 1953, the worl d had 
a resurgence of hope . No one can question that Chairman 
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Khrushchev has altered many things in the Soviet Union . 
He has introduced welcome measures of normalization in 
many sectors of Soviet life. He has abandoned the classic 
communist concept of the inevitability of war . He has 
r ecognized---inter mittently, at least---the appalling 
dangGr of nuclear weapons . 
But there is one thing he has not altered- - - and 
that is the bas ic drive to abolish the world of the 
Charte r, to destroy the hone of a pluralistic world order . 
He has not altered the basic drive to fulfill the prophecies 
of Marx and Lenin and make t he world communist . And he 
has demonstrated his singleness of purpose in a succession 
of aggressive acts---the suppression of the East German 
uprisings in 1953 and the Hunga rian Revolution in 1956, 
in the series of manufactured crises and truculent demands 
t hat the Allies get out of West Berlin, in the resumption 
of nuclear testing , in the explosion---defying a resolution 
of the General Assembly---of a 50 megaton bomb in the 
continued stimulation of guerrilla and subversive warfare 
all over t he globe , in the compulsive intervention in the 
internal a f fai rs of other nations, whether by diplomatic 
assault, by economic pressure , by mobs and riots, by 
propaganda , or by espionage . 
The worl d ·welcomed the process k.YJ.o\.m a s "de- Stalinization" 
and the movement toward a more normal life within the Soviet 
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Union . But the world has not yet seen compar able changes 
in Soviet foreign policy. 
VII 
It is this which has shadowed the world since the 
end of the second World War---which has diruned our hopes 
of peach and progress , which ha.s forced those nations 
determined to def end their freedom to take measures in 
their own self- defense . In this effort , the leadership 
has inevitably fallen in large degree on the United St ates . 
I do not believe that every action we have taken in the 
effort to strengthen the independence of nations has 
necessarily been correct ; we do not subscribe to the 
thesis of national infallibility for any nation . But 
we do take great pride in the role we have performed . 
Our response to the remorseless Soviet expansionism 
has taken many forms . 
We have sought loyally to support the United Nations , 
be faithful to the world of the Charter , and to build an 
operating system that acts , and does not talk , for peace . 
We have never refused to negotiate . We have sat 
at conference after conference seeking peaceful solutions 
to menacing conflicts . 
He have worked for general and complete disarmament 
under international supervision . We have tried earnestly 
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and---we won ' t stop trying---to reach an agreement to end 
all nuclear test i ng . 
He hA.ve declined to be provoked into act i ons which 
might lead to war--- in face of such challenges as the 
Berlin blockade , such affronts to humanity as the repression 
of the Hungarian revolt, such atrocities as the erection 
of that shameful wall to fence in the East Ge r mans who 
had f led to the West in such v~st multitudes . 
VJe ha ve assisted nations, both allied and unaligned, 
who have shovm a will to maintain their national independence. 
To shield them and ourselves , we have rebuilt our armed 
forces ---established defensive alliances- --and , year after 
year, r eluctantly devoted a large share of our resources 
to nat i onal defense. 
Together with our allies , we have installed certain 
bases overs eas as a prudent precaution in response to the 
clear and persistent Soviet threats. In 1959, 18 months 
after the boasts of Chairman Khrushchev had called the 
world ' s attention to the threat of Soviet long range missiles, 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization---without concealment 
or deceit---as a consequence of agreements freely negotiated 
and publicly declared, placed intermedia te- range ballistic 
missiles in the NATO area . The wa rheads of these missiles 
r emain in the custody of the United States, and the decision 
fo r their us e rests in the hands of the President of the 
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United States of America in association with the governments 
involved. 
VIII 
I regret that people here at the United Nations seem 
to believe that ·the Cold War is a private struggle between 
two great superpowers . It isn ' t a private struggle; it 
is a world civil war---a contest between the pluralistic 
world and the monolithic world---a contest between the 
world of the Charter and the world of Communist conformity. 
Every nation tha t is now independent and wants to remain 
independent is involved, whether they know it or not . 
Every nation is involved in this grim, costly, distasteful 
division in the world , no matter how remote and how uninterested . 
We all recognized this in 1950 , when the Communists 
decided to test how far they could go by direct military 
action and unleashed the invasion of South Korea . The 
response of the United Nations taught them that overt 
aggression would produce not appeasement, but resistance . 
This remains the essential lesson . The United Nations 
stood firm in Korea because we knew the consequences of 
appeasement . 
The policy of appeasement is always intended to 
strengthen the moderates in the country appeased; but its 
effect is al1.\rays to strengthen the extremists . We are 
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prepared t o meet and reconcile ever y legitimate Soviet 
concern; but we ha ve onl~r contempt for blackmail . We 
lmow t hat every retreat before intimido.tion strengthens 
those who s:iy that the threat of forc e can always achieve 
Communist objectives---and undermines those in the Soviet 
Union who are urging caution and res traint , even cooperation. 
Reluctantly and repeatedly , we have to face the sad 
fact tha t the only way to r einforc e thos e on the other 
side who are for moderation and peaceful competition is 
to make it absolutely clear that aggression will be met 
with r esistance , and force with forc e . 
The time has come for this Council to decide whether 
to make a serious attempt to bring peace to the world---
or to let t he United Nations s t and idly by while the vast 
plan of piecemeal aggression unfolds , conducted in the 
hopes that no sinele issue will seem conseauential enough 
to mobil ize the r esi stance of t he free peoples. For my 
own government , this question is not in doubt . Vle remain 
committed to the principles of the United ~Jations Charter , 
and we intend to def end them . 
IX 
We are engaged today in a crucial test of those 
principles . Nearly four years ago a revolution took place 
on the island of Cuba . This revolution overthrew a hated 
dictatorship in t he name of democratic freedom and social 
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progress . Dr. Castro made explicit promises to the people 
of Cuba. . He promised them the restoration of the 1940 
constitution abandoned by the Batista dictatorship ; · a 
"provisional government of entirely civilian character 
that will return the country to normality and hold general 
elections within a period of no more than one year"; 
"truly honest" elections along with " full and untrammeled" 
freedom of information and political activity. 
That is what Dr. Castro offered the people of Cuba . 
That is what the people of Cuba accepted . Many in my own 
country and throughout the Americas sympathized with Dr . 
Castro ' s stated objectives . The United States Government 
offered immediate diplomatic recognition and stood ready 
to provide the revolutionary regime with economic assistance . 
But a grim struggle took place within the revolutionary 
regime, between its democratic and its predominant Communist 
wings ---between those who overthrew Batista to bring 
freedom to Cuba, and those who overthrew Batista to bring 
Cuba to Conwunism . In a few months the struggle was over . 
Brave men who had fougnt with Castro in the Sierra Maestra 
and who had organized the underground o.eaj_nst Batista in 
the cities were nssailed , arrested , and driven from office 
into prison or exile , all for the single offense of anti-
communism, all for the single offensG of bel i eving in the 
principles of the revolution they fought for . By the end 
of 1959 , the Communist Party was the only party in Cuba 
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permi tted fr eedom of political action . By early 1960 , 
the Castro r egime wns entering into intimate economic 
and pol-Ltic:tl relations with the Soviet Union . 
It is well to r emember t hat all t hes e events took 
place months before the United States s t opped buying Cuban 
sugar in the swnmer of 1960---and many more months be fo r e 
exactions upon our Embassy in Havana forced the s 1..tspension 
of diplomatic relat i ons in December 1960 . 
As the communi zation of Cuba proceeded , more and 
more democratic Cubans , men who had fought for freedom 
in the front ranks , were forced into exile . They were 
eager to return to their homeland and to save their 
revolution from betrayal . In the spring of 1961 , they 
tried to liberate their country , under the political 
leadership of Dr . Castro ' s first Prime Minister , and 
of a Revolutionary Council composed without exception of 
men who had opposed Batista a~d backed the Revolut ion . 
The people and government of the United States sympathi zed 
with these men---as thr oughout our history Americans 
have always sympathized with those who sought to liberat e 
their native lands from despotism . I have no apologies 
to make for that sympathy , or for the assistance which 
these brave Cuban refugees received froCT our hands . But 
I would point out , too, that my Government , still fo r bearing , 
refrained from direct intervention . It sent no American 
t roops t o Cuba . 
- 98-
In the year and a half since , Dr . Castro has continued 
the communiz~tion of his unfortunate country . The 194o 
constitution was never restored . Elections were never 
held and their promise wi thor a\·m--- though '9r. Castro 1 s 
twelve months have stretched to forty- two . The Castro 
regime fastened on Cuba an iron system of repression . 
It eradicated human and civil rights. It openly trans-
formed Cuba into a communist satellite and a police state . 
Whatever benefit this regime might have brought to Cuba 
has long since been cancelled out by the firing squads , 
the drumhead executions, the hunger and miser y , the 
suppression of civil and political and cultural freedom . 
Yet even these violations of human rights , repellent 
as they are---even this dictatorship , cruel as it may be---
would not, if kept within the confines of one country, 
constitute a direct threat to the peace and independence 
of other states . The threat lies in the submission of 
the Castro regime to the will of an aggressive foreign 
power . It lies in its readiness to break up the r ela-
tions of confidence and cooperation among the good neighbors 
of this hemisphere---at a time when the Alliance for Progress , 
that vast effort to raise living standards for all peoples 
of the Americas, has given new vitality and hope to the 
inter- American system . 
Let me make it absolutely clear what the issue of 
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Cuba is . It is not an issue of revolution . This hemisphere 
has seen many revolutions, including the one which gave 
my own nation its independence . 
It is not an issue of reform . My nation has lived 
happily with other countries which have had thorough-
going and fundamental social transformations like Mexico 
and Bolivia . The whole point of the Alliance for Progress 
is to bring about an economic and social revolution in 
the Americas . 
It is not an issue of socialism. As Secretary of 
State Rusk said at Punta del Este in February : "Our 
hemisphere has room for a diversity of economic systems ." 
It is not an issue of dictatorship. The American 
republics have lived with dictators before . If this were 
his only fault, they could even live with Dr . Castro . 
The foremost objection of the states of the 
Americas to the Castro regime is not because it is revolu-
tionary, not because it is socialistic, not because it 
is dictatorial, not even because Dr . Castro perverted a 
noble revolution in the interests of a squalid totalitarianism. 
It is because he has aided and abetted an invasion of this 
hemisphere--- and an invasion at just the time when the 
hemisphere is making a new and unprecedented effort for 
economic progress and social reform . 
The crucial fact is that Cuba has given the Soviet 
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Union a bridgehead and staging area in t his hemisphere~-­
that it has i nvited as extra - continental , anti - democratic 
and expans ion i st power into the bosom of the American 
f amily---tha t it has made its elf Dn accomplice j_n the 
communist enterprise of world dominion . 
There are those who seek to eque. te the presence of 
Soviet bases in Cuba with the presence of NATO bas es in 
parts of the world near the Soviet Union . 
Let us subject this facile argument to critical 
consideration. 
It is not only that the Soviet a ction in Cuba has 
created a n ew and dange:rous s ituation by s:idden and 
drastic steps which imperil the security of all mankind . 
It is necessary further to examine the purposes 
for which missiles are introduced and bases established . 
Missiles which help a country defend its indepen-
dence---which leave the pol itical institutions of the 
recipient countries intact---which are not designed to 
subvert the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence or other states---which a r e installed without 
concealment or deceit---assistance in this f orm and with 
t hese purposes is consistent with the principles of the 
Uni ted Nat j. ons . 5ut missiles which introduce a nuclear 
threat into an area now fr ee of it---which threaten the 
s ecurity and independence of defens eless neighboring 
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states---which are installed by clandestine means ---which 
result in t~e most formidable nuclear base in the world 
outside existing treaty systems---assistance in this form 
and with these purposes is r adically different . 
Let me state this point very clearly. The missile 
sites in NATO countries were established in response to 
missile sites in the Soviet Union directed at the NATO 
countries . The NATO states had every right and necess ity 
to respond to the installation of these Soviet missiles 
by installing missiles of their mm. . These missiles 
were designed to deter a process of expansion already 
in progress . Fortunately , they have helped to do so . 
The United States and its Allies established their 
missile sites after free negotiation, without concealment 
and without false statements to other governments. 
There is , in short, a vast difference between 
the long- range missile sites establi shed years ago in 
Europe and the long- range missile sites established by 
the Soviet Union in Cuba during the last three months . 
There is a final significant difference . For 
one hundred and fifty years the nations of the Americas 
have painfully labored to construct a hemisphere of in-
dependent and cooperating nations---fr ee from foreign 
threats. An internntional system far older than this 
one---the Inter- American system---has been erected on this 
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principle . The principle of the t e rritorial integrity 
of the Western hemisphere has been woven into the history, 
the l i fe and the thought of all the people of the Americas . 
In striking at t hat principle the Soviet Union is striking 
at the stronges t and most enduring strain in the policy 
of this hemisphere . It i s disrupting t he convictions and 
aspirations of a century and a half . It is intruding on 
the firm policies of twent y nations . To allow this challenge 
to go unanswered whould be to undermine a basic and historic 
pillar of the security of this hemisphere . 
Twenty year s a go the nations of the Iunericas were 
understandably disturbed by the t hreat of Nazism . Just 
as they would have reacted with vigor had any American 
r epublic given its elf over to the doctrines and agents 
of Nazism, so today they look with equal concern on the 
conquest of Cuba by a foreign power and an al i en ideology. 
They do not intend to applau6 and assist whi le Dr . Castro 
and his new friends t r y to hal t the march of fre e and 
progressive democracy in La tin Ameri ca . 
Yet despite the ominous movement of affairs in Cuba , 
the r eaction of the hemisphere , and of my own Government 
continued to be marked by forbearance . Despite Dr . Castro ' s 
verbal assults on other nations in the hemisphere , despite 
his campaign of subversion a gainst their governments , 
despite the insurrectionary expeditions launched from 
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Cuba, the nations of the Americas retained their hope 
that the Cuban Revolution would free itself . Dut Dr . 
Castro ' s persistence---his campaigns against the governments 
of this hemisphere---his decision to become the junior 
partner of Moscow---finally destroyed that hope . 
If Cuba has withdrawn from the American family 
of nations , it has been Dr . Castro ' s own act . If Cuba 
is today isolated from its brethren of the Americas , it 
is self- inflicted isolation . If the present Cuban govern-
ment has turned its back on its own history, tradition , 
religion and culture, if it has chosen to cast its lot 
with the Communist empire , it must accept the consequences 
of its decision . The Hemisphere has no alternative but 
to accept the tragic choice Dr . Castro has imposed on his 
people---that is , to accept Cuba ' s self- exclusion from 
the Hemisphere . 
One after another , the other governments of this 
hemisphere have withdrawn their diplomatic representatives 
from Cuba . Today only three still have their ambassadors 
in Havana . Las t Febru a ry the American states unanimous ly 
declared that the Castro regime was incompatible with the 
principles on which the Organization of American States 
had been founded and, by a two- thirds vote, excluded that 
r egime from participation in the Inter- American system . 
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XIII 
All this took place before Soviet arms and technicians 
began to move into Cuba in a massive , continuous stream . 
But , even then, the ~overnments of the hemisphere were 
willing to withhold final judgement so long as the 
Soviet weapons ·were defensive . And my Government ---and 
the United Nations---were solemnly assured by the repre-
sentatives of both Soviet Rus sia and Cuba that the Soviet 
arms pouring into the island were , in fact , purely defensive 
weapons . 
On September 22 , the Soviet Government said in an 
official statement : "The armaments and military equipment 
sent to Cuba are designed exclusively for defensive purposes ." 
The Soviet Government added that Soviet rockets were so 
powerful that "there is no need to search for sites for 
them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union. " And 
last week , on October 18th, Hr . Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign 
1<inis ter, told the Pres id en t of the United States at the 
'White House that Soviet assistance to Cuba , "pursued 
solely the purpose of contributing to the defense capabilities 
of Cuba ," tl':at "training by Soviet specialists of Cuban 
nationals in handling defensive armaments was by no means 
offensive , " and that 11 if it were otherwise , the Soviet 
Government would have never become involved in rendering 
such assistanc e ." This once peaceable island is being 
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transformed into a formidable missile and strategic air 
base armed with the deadliest, far - reaching modern nuclear 
weapons . 
The statement issued by the Soviet Government this 
morning does not deny these facts - - - which is in refreshing 
contrast to the categoric assurances on this subject which 
they pr eviously had given. 
However, this same statement repeats the extraordinary 
claim that Soviet arms in Cuba are of a "defensive character . " 
I should like to know what the Soviets consider " offensive" 
weapons . In t he Soviet lexicon evidently all weapons a r e 
purely defensive , even weapons that can strike from 1 , 000 
to 2 , 000 miles away . Words can be stretched only so far 
without losing their meaning altogether . But semantic 
disputes a r e fruitless , and the fact remains that the 
Soviet has upset the precarious balance and created a 
new and dangerous situation in a new area . 
This is precisely the sort of action which the 
Soviet Government is so fond of denouncing as " a policy 
of' pos itions of strength." Consequently, I invite the 
attention of the Council to another remark in the Soviet 
Government ' s statement of this morning : " only madmen 
bank on a policy of positions of strength and believe 
that this policy will br ing any success, will help make 
it possible to impose their orders on other states ." 
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I need only mention one other curious remark in the 
Soviet Government ' s stat ement of today , and I quote once 
more : "Who gave the United States the right to assume 
the role of the master of destinies of other countries 
and people? • • • Cuba belongs to the Cuban peoples and 
only they can be masters of their destiny." This latte r 
sentence is , of cours e , the succinct statement of United 
States policy toward Cuba . It is , however , very far 
from being Soviet policy toward Cuba . 
When the Soviet Union sends thousands of military 
technicians to its satellite in the Western Hemisphere---
when it sends jet bombers capable of delivering nuclear 
weapons ---when it installs in Cuba missiles capable of 
carrying atomic warheads and of obliterating the Panama 
Canal , Mexico City and Washington---when it prepares sites 
for additional missiles with a range of 2 , 200 miles and 
a capacity to strike at targets from Peru to Hudson ' s Bay---
when it does t hese things under the cloak of secrecy and 
to the accompaniment of premeditated deception---when i t s 
actions are in fla~rant viola t ion of the pol i cies of the 
Organization of American States and of the Charter of the 
United Nntions ---this clearly is· a threat to this hemisphere . 
And when it thus upsets the precarious balance in the world , 
it is a threat to the whol e world . 
We now know that the Soviet Union , not content with 
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Dr . Castro's oath of fealty , not content with the destruction 
of Cuban independence, not content with the extension of 
Soviet power into the Western Hemisphere, not content 
with a challenge to the Inter- American system and the 
United Nations Charter , has decided to transform Cuba 
into a base for Communist aggression, into a base for 
putting all of the Americans under the nuclear gun and 
thereby intensify the Soviet diplomacy of blackmail in 
every part of the world . 
In _our passion for peace, we have forborne greatly. 
But there must be limits to forbearance, if forbearance 
is not to become the diagram for the destruction of this 
Organization . Dr . Castro transformed Cuba into a total-
itarian dictatorship with impunity---he extinguished the 
rights of political freedom \.·.ri th i mpuni ty---he aligned 
himself with the Soviet bloc with impunity---he accepted 
defensive weapons from the Soviet Union with impunity---
he welcomed thousands of Co~unists into Cuba with 
impunity---but , when , with cold deliberation , he turns 
his country over to the Soviet Union for a long- range 
missile launching base , and thus carries the Soviet progr am 
for aggression into the heart of the Americas , the day 
of forbearance is pas t . 
XIV 
If the Unit ed States and the other nations of the 
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Western Hemisphere should accept this new phase of 
aggression , we would be delinquent in our obligations to 
world peace . If the United States and the other nations 
of the Western Hemisphere should accept this basic dis -
turbance of the world ' s structure of power , we would 
invite a new surge of communist aggression at every point 
along the frontier which divides the Communist world from 
the democratic world . If we do not stand firm here , our 
adversaries may think that we will stand firm nowhere---
and we guarantee a heightening of the world civil war 
to new levels of intensity and danger . 
We hope t hat Chairman Khrushchev has not made a 
miscalculation, that he has not mistaken forbearance for 
weakness . '\.Ale cannot believe that he has deluded himself 
into supposing that though we have power , we lack nerve; 
that , though we have weapons, we are without the will to 
use them. 
We still hope , we still pray that the worst may be 
avoided---that the Soviet leadership will call an end 
to this ominous adventure . Accordingl y , the President 
has initiated steps to quar antine Cuba a r,ainst further 
imports of offensive military equipment . Because the 
entire inter- American system is challenged , the President 
last night called for an immediate meet i ng of the Or gan 
of Consultation of the Organization of the American States , 
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to consider this threat to hemispheric security and to 
invoke Article 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty in support of 
all necessary nction . They nre meeting now. The 
results of their deliberations will soon be available to 
you . 
Mr . President , I am submitting today a resolution 
to the Security Council designed to find a way out of 
this calamitous situation. 
This resolution calls, as an interim measure under 
Article 40 of the Charter, for the immediate dismantaling 
and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other 
offensive weapons . 
It further authorizes and requests the Acting Secretary 
General to dispatch to Cuba a United Nations observer 
corps to assure and report on compliance with this 
r esolution . 
Upon lm certification of compliance, it calls for 
the termination of the measures of quarantine a gainst 
military shipments to Cuba . 
And, in conclusion , it urgently recommends that 
the United States of America and the Soviet Union confer 
promptly on measures to remove the existing threat to 
the security of the ~estern Hemisphere and the peace 
of t he world , and to report thereon to the Security 
Council . 
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xv 
Mr . President, I have just been informed that 
the Organization of American States this afternoon 
adopted a resolution by 19 affirmative votes containing 
the following operative paragraphs : 
"The Council of the Organization of Inter- American 
States , meeting as the Provisional Organ of Consultation , 
resolved : 
1 . ·To call for the immediate dismantling and with-
drawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons 
wi th any offensive capability; 
2 . To recommend that the Member States in accordance 
with !lrticles 6 and 8 of the Inter- American Treaty 
of Reciprocal Assistance take al~ measures 
individually and collectively , including the 
use of armed force , which they may deem necessary, 
to insure that the government of Cuba cannot 
continue to receive from the Sino- Soviet power 
military material and related supplies which may 
threaten the peace and the security of the 
continent and to prevent the missiles in Cuba 
with offensive capability from ever becoming 
an active threat to the peace and the security 
of the continent; 
3. Decides to inform the Security Council of the 
United Nations of this resolution in accordance 
with Article 54 of the Charter of the United 
Nations , and expresses the hope that the 
Security Council will , in accordance with the 
resolution introduced by the United States , 
dispatch United Nations observers to Cuba at 
the earliest moment ." 
XVI 
Mr . President , the issue which confronts the Security 
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Cou~cil today is grave . Since the e~d of the second Worl d 
~ar , there has be0n no t hreat to the vision of peace so 
profound---no challenge to the world of the Charter so 
fateful . The hopes of mankind a r e concentrated in this 
room . The action we take may determine the future of 
civilization . I :know that this Council ·will approach 
the issue 'l:!itl"' a f ul l sense of our r esponsibility and a 
solemn understandinp, of the i mport of our deliberations. 
There is a road to peace . The beginning of that 
road is marked out in the r esolution I have submitted 
for your consideration. If we act promptly we will have 
another chance to take up again the dreadful questions 
of nuclear ar~s and military bases and the means and 
causes of a~gression and war---to take them up and do 
something about them . 
This is a solemn and significant day fo r t he life 
of t he United Nations and t he hope of ,., rorld community. 
Let it be remembered, not as t he day when the world came 
to the edge of nuclear war, but as the day when men 
r esolved to let nothing thereafter stop them in their 
quest for peace . 
APPBNDI:( B 
Mr . Pierre Fuerst , Director 
United Nations Archives 
New York, N. Y. 
Dear Sir: 
420 w. Pierce St . 
Charleston , Ill . 61920 
Sept . 13 , 1971 
I am a gr aduate student at Eastern Illinois Univer sity 
and , at present, I am working on my thesis . Since my 
thesis deals with Mr . Adlai E. Stevenson ' s speeches t o 
the U. N. during the Cuban missile crises it is imperative 
that I obtain copies of the seventeen speeches which he 
delivered to the U. N. dealing with this matter . 
In my research I have been unable to find copies of the 
seventeen s peeches and was wondering if you could supply 
texts of Mr . Stevenson ' s speeches to me . If you could 
send all or any of the seventeen speeches it would be 
most helpful . If you cannot supply me with the necessary 
informat ion per haps you could direct me to the proper 
channel . 
Thank you very much for your assistance . 
Sincerely , 
Jeanne F . Jones 
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UNITED NATIONS ,.~) NATIONS UN IES ~~  
NEW YORK 
C A • LC A 00 111t••• • UNATION • NCWYCllltK • AO•&aac TC. L C. O •A~H IQU C 
Thank you for your recent inquiry . 
The records of the r.1eeting t o which you r efer will be 
published as : 
Official Records of the General AssemblI 
Official Records of the Secw·i t;y Council 
Official Records of the Economic and Social Council 
Official Records of the TrusteeshiE CoWlcil 
However, it will be at leas t six months tn a· year before these records 
are printed and available as sales documents of the United Ha tions . 
In the meantime, I su~est that you consult the United Nations 
Honthl,,y Chronicle. The Chronicle in the official monthly magazine 
of the United Nati ons which reports on the activities of the Organi-
zation. Individual copies are $L. oo, and a n annual subscription 
costs ·$9.50. Copies of the Chro@cle are available in most public 
libra r ies or may be obta ined from: 
In the United States 
United Nations 
Sales Section 
Room LX- 2314 
l~ew York City 10017 
In Canada 
InfornBtion Canada 
Inte rnational Publications 
Publishing Division 
ottawa, Ontario 
Canada. 
It may also be possible for you to receive copies of those speeches 
which are of interest to you by writing to the appropriate delegations 
or information services of the c ountries concerned . 
Your~ truly, 
(Mrs . ) i-ladeleine G. Mitchell 
Acting Chief 
Public Inquiries Section 
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INFOHMATION SERVICES AND EMBASSIES IN 
THE UNITBD STATES OF MRrvrn;;:RS 
OF THE UNIT1~D NATIONS 
Afghanistan 
Embassy of Afghanistan 
2341 Wyoming Ave ., N. W. 
Washington , D.C. 20008 
Al bania 
Per manent Miss ion of the Peo ple ' s 
Republlc ~~ Albania to the U. N. 
250 E. 87 Stree t , 21st Floor 
New York , N. Y. 10028 
1\l . i. geria 
Permanent ~ission of Algeria to the U. N. 
750 Third Avenue , 14th Floor 
New York , N. Y. 10017 
Argentina 
Embassy of the Argentine Republic 
1600 New Hampshire Avenue , N. W. 
Washington , D. C. 20009 
Aus tralia 
Australia News and I nformation Bureau 
636 Fifth Avenue 
New Yo r k , N. Y. 10020 
Austria 
Austrian Information Service 
31 East 69th Street 
New York , N.Y. 10021 
Barbados 
Barbados Tourist Board 
801 Second Avenue, 2nd Floor 
New York, N. Y. 10017 
Belgium 
Belgian Gov ernment Information 
Center 
50 Rockefeller Plaza , Room 1102 
New York , ~ .Y . 10020 
Boli via 
Embassy of Bolivia ~ 
1145 19th Street , N.W., Suite 212 
Washington , D. C. 20036 
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Botswana 
Embassy of Botswana 
1825 Connecticut Avenue, i'J . V.J . Suite 310- 311 
'.vashington, D .C. 20009 
Brazil 
Brazilian Government Trade Bureau 
551 Fifth Avenue 
New York , N. Y. 10017 
Bulgaria 
Embassy of t he People's Republic of Bulgaria 
2100 Sixteenth Street , N. W. 
Washington , D.c. 20009 
Burma 
Consulate General of Burma 
10 East 77th Street 
New York , N.Y. 10021 
Burundi 
Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Burundi to the U. N. 
485 Fifth Avenue , 5th Floor 
New York , N.Y. 10017 
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist ~epublic 
See Union of Sovie t Social ist Republics 
:+cambodia (Kh1ner Republic) 
Emba s sy of t he I~hmer Republic 
1705 New Hampshi re Ave . , N. \·J. 
1
.·Jashingt on , D. C. 20009 
Cameroon 
Embassy of the Federal Republic of Cameroon 
1703- 1707 New Hampshire Ave . , N. W. 
~fushington , D. C. 20009 
Canada 
Consulate General of Canada 
Press and Information Service 
680 Fif t h Avenue 
New York , N. Y. 10019 
*Proclaimed October 1970 the Khm er nepublic by 
constituti onal act . 
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Central African qepublic 
Embas sy of the Central African Republic 
1618 22nd Street , N. W. 
Washington , D. C. 20008 
Ceylon 
Embassy of Ceylon 
2148 i1Jyoming Avenue 
Washington , D. C. 20008 
Chad 
Embassy of the Re public of Chad 
1132 New Hampshire Avenue, N. 1.V . 
Washington, D. C. 20037 
Chile 
Consulate General of Chile 
809 United Nations Plaza, 4th Floor 
New York , N. Y. 10017 
China 
Chinese Information Service 
100 w. 32nd Stt'eet, 3rd Floor 
New York , N. Y. 10001 
Colombia 
Colombia Information Service 
140 East 57th Street , 4th Floor 
New York , N. Y. 10022 
Congo (Brazzaville) 
Permanent Mis sion of the People ' s Republic of the Congo 
( Brazzaville) to the U.N. 
444 Madison Avenue, Room 1604 
New York, N. Y. 10022 
Congo (Democratic Re public) 
Permanent Mission of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo to the U. N. 
400 East 5lst Street 
New York , N. Y. 10022 
Costa Rica 
Consulate General of Costa Rica 
211 East 43rd Street , Room 606 
New York , N. Y. 10017 
Cuba 
Permanent Mission of Cuba to the U. N. 
6 East 67th Street 
New York, N. Y. 10021 
Cyprus 
Consulate General of Cyprus 
820 Second Avenue , 12th Floor 
New York, N. Y. 10017 
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Czechoslovakia 
Embassy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 
3900 Linnean Avenue , N. Vl . 
Washington , D.c. 20008 
Dahomey 
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Dahomey to the U. N. 
4 East 73rd Street 
New York , N. Y. 10021 
Denmark 
Danish Consulate General 
280 Park Avenue 
New York , N. Y. 10017 
Dominican Republ ic 
Consulate General of the Dominican Republic 
1270 6th Avenue , Room 300 
New York , N. Y. 10020 
Ecuador 
Cultural Attache 
Embassy of Ecuador 
2535 15th Street, N. W. 
Washington , D. C. 20009 
F:l Salvador 
Consulate General of El Salvador 
211 East 43rd Street 
New York , N. Y. 10017 
Equatorial Guinea 
Permanent Mission of Equatorial Guinea to the U.N. 
440 East 62nd Street , Apt . 6- D 
New York , N. Y. 10017 
Ethiopia 
Consulate General of Ethiopia 
866 United Nations Pl aza 
New York , N. Y. 10017 
Finland 
Consulate General of Finland 
200 East 4?nd Street 
New York , N. Y. 10017 
Fiji 
Permanent Mission of Fiji to the U. N. 
845 Third ~venue , 19th Floor 
New York , N.Y. 10017 
France 
Embassy of France 
972 Fifth ./\venue 
New York , N.Y. 10021 
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Gabon 
Permanent Mission of the Republ i c of Gabon to the U.N. 
866 United Nations Plaza, Rm . 536 
New York, N. Y. 10017 
Gambia 
Permanent Mission of Gambia to the U. N. 
51 .East 42nd Street, i7th Floor 
New York, N. Y. 10017 
Ghana 
Consulate General of Ghana 
Information Section 
565 Fifth Avenue 
New York , N. Y. 10017 
Greece 
Greek Informat :Lon Service 
69 East 79th Street 
New York, N. Y. 10021 
Guatemala 
Consulate General of Guatemala 
1270 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, N. Y. 10020 
Guinea 
Embassy of Guinea 
2112 Ler oy Place, N. W. 
Washington, D. C. 20008 
Guyana 
Consulate of' Guyana 
355 Lexington Avenue , 16th Floor 
New York, N. Y. 10017 
Haiti 
Embassy of Haiti 
4400 Seventeenth Street, N. W. 
Washington, D.c. 20011 
Honduras 
Consula.te General of Honduras 
290 r~adison Avenue 
New York , N .Y ~ 10017 
Hungary 
Embassy of the Hungarian People ' s Republic 
2437 i5th Street, N.w. 
Washington , D. C. 20009 
Iceland 
Consulate General of Iceland 
420 Lexington Avenue 
New York, N. Y. 100~7 
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India 
India Inf~hmation Service 
3 East 64 Street 
New York , N. Y. 10021 
Indonesia 
Indonesian Consulate General 
5 East 68th Street 
New York, N.Y. 10021 
Iran 
Iranian Economic ~iss ion 
5530 Wisconsin Avenue , Suite 850 
'v.fashington, D. C. 20015 
I rag 
Permanent Mission of Iraq to the U. N. 
c/o Press ~fficer 
14 East 79 h Street 
New York , N.Y. 10021 
Ireland 
Consulate General of Ireland 
580 Fifth ·'\venue 
New York , N.Y. 10036 
Israel 
i~eE!~~a76tgr~~~:e~f Information 
New York , N. Y. 10021 
Italy 
Italian Cultural Institute 
686 Park Avenue 
New York , N. Y. 10021 
Ivory Coas~ 
Embassy of Ivory Coast 
2424 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W. 
Washington, D. C. 20008 
Jamaica 
Consulate General of Jamaica 
Information Service 
200 Park Avenue 
New York, N. Y. 10017 
Japan 
Japan Information Service 
Consulate General of Japan 
235 East 42nd Street 
New York, N.Y. 10017 
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Jordan 
Permanent Mission of Jordan to the U. N. 
866 United Nations Plaza, Hm. 552 
New York , N.Y. 10017 
Kenya 
Permanent Mission of the Republi..c of Kenya to the U. N. 
866 United Nations Plaza , Hrn . Li-86 
New York , N. Y. 10017 
Kuwait 
Consulate General of Kuw~~t 
235 East 42nd Street , 27 Floor 
New York , N. Y. 10017 
Laos 
Royal Rmbassy of Laos 
2222 "S" Street , n.w. 
Washington , D. C. 20008 
Lebanon 
Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the U. N. 
866 United Nations Plaza, Rm . 533- 535 
New Yor k, N.Y. 10017 
Lesotho 
Embassy of Lesotho 
Caravel Building 
1601 Connecticut Ave ., N.w. , Suite 300 
Washington , D. C. 20009 
Liberia 
Consulate General of Liberia 
1120 Avenue of the Americns 
New York , N. Y. 10036 
Libya 
Embassy of the libyan Arab Republic 
2344 Hassachuset t s Avenue, N. W. 
hfashtngton, D. C. 20008 
Luxembourg 
Consulate General of Luxembourg 
200 East 42nd Street 
New York , N.Y. 10017 
Madagascar • 
Embassy of the Malagasy Republic 
2374 Massachusetts Avenue , N. W. 
Washington, D. C. 20008 
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Malawi 
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Malawi to the U. N. 
777 Third Avenue , 24th Floor 
New York , N. Y. 10017 
Malaysia 
Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the U. N. 
845 Third Avenue, 16th Floor 
New York , N. Y. 10022 
Mali 
Embassy of the Republic of Mali 
2130 "R" Street, N.W. 
Washington , D. c . 20008 
Maldive Islands 
Embassy of the Jvfaldi ve Islands 
2013 "Q" Street , N. W. 
Washington, D. c . 20009 
Malta 
Permanent Mission of Malta to the U. N. 
249 East 35th Street 
New York, N. Y. 10016 
Mauritania 
Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania 
to the U. N. 
8 West 4oth Street , 18th Floor 
New York, N. Y. 10018 
Mauritius 
Embassy of Mauritius 
2308 Wyoming Avenue, N. W. 
Washington , D. C. 20008 
Mexico 
Consulate General of Mexico 
8 East 4lst Street 
New York , N.Y. 10017 
Mongolia 
Permanent Mission of the Mongolian People's Republic 
to the U. N. 
6th East 77th Street 
New York, N. Y. 10021 
~ Morocco 
Embassy of Morocco 
1601 21st Street , N.W. 
Washington, D. C. 20009 
Nepal 
Royal Nepalese Consulate General 
300 East 46th Street 
New York, N. Y. 10017 
- 122-
Netherlands 
Netherlands Information Service 
711 Third Avenue , Room 1803 
New York , N.Y. 10017 
New Zealand 
New Zealand Consulate General 
630 Fifth Avenue, Suite 530 
New York , N. Y. 10020 
Nicaragua · 
Consulate General of Nicaragua 
1270 Avenue of the Americas, Rm . 1818 
New York , N. Y. 10020 
Nip; er 
Permanent Mission of Niger to the U.N. 
866 United Nations Plaza, Suite 570 
New York , N. Y. 10917 
Nigeria 
Consulate General of Nigeria 
575 Lexington Avenue 
New York, N. Y. 10022 
Norway 
Norwegian Embassy Information Service 
825 Third Avenue, 18th Floor 
New York , N.Y. 10022 
Pakistan 
Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the U. N. 
8 East 65th Street 
New York , N. Y. 10021 
Panama 
Panama Government Tourist Bureau 
630 Fifth Avenue 
New York , N.Y. 10020 
Paraguay 
Consula te General of Paraguay 
World Trade Center, Suite 1609 
New York, N.Y. 10048 
Peru 
Consulate General of Peru 
10 Rockefeller Plaza, ioth Floor 
New York , N.Y. 10020 
Philippines 
Consulate r,eneral of the Philippines 
15 East 66~h Street 
New York , N. Y. 10021 
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Poland 
Embassy of the Polish People ' s Republic 
2640 Sixteenth Street , N. W. 
'"Jashington , D. C. 20009 
Portugal 
Casa de Portugal 
570 Fifth Avenue 
New York, N.Y. 10036 
Romania 
Embassy of the Romanian Peo~le ' s Republic 
1607 23rd Street , N. W. 
Washington, D. C. 20008 
Rwanda 
Permanent Mifision of the Rwandese Republic to the U. N. 
120 East 56 Street , Room 630 
New York, N. Y. 10017 
Saudi Arabia 
Embassytgf Saudi Arabia 
1520 18 Street N. W. 
Washington , D. C. 20036 
Senegal 
Embassy of the Republic of Senegal 
2112 Wyoming Avenue, N. W. 
Washington , D. C. 20008 
Sierra Leone 
Permanent Mission of Sierra Leone to the U.N . 
Information Attache 
30 "&a.st 42nd Street , Room 609 
New York , N. Y. 10017 
Singapore 
Permanent Mission of Singapore to the U.N. 
711 Third Avenue 
New York , N.Y. 10017 
Somalia 
Embassy of the Somalia Republic 
1875 Connecticut Avenue, N . 1.v. 
Washington , D. C. 20009 
South Africa 
South African Information Service 
655 Madison Avenue , 14th Floor 
New York, N.Y . 10021 
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Southern Yemen * 
Permanent Mission of the People ' s Democratic Republic 
of Yemen to the U. N. 
211 East 43rd Street, Room 605 
New York , N. Y. 10017 
Snain 
Spanish Tourist Office 
589 Fifth AVGnue 
New York , N. Y. 10017 
Sudan 
Consulate General of the Republic of Sudan 
757 Third Avenue 
New York , N. Y. 10017 
Swaziland 
Embassy of Swaziland 
2233 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W. 
Washington , D. C. 20007 
Sweden 
Swedish Information Service 
825 Third Avenue 
New York , N.Y. 10002 
Syria 
Permanent Mipsion of the Syrian Arab Republic to the U. N. 
150 East 58 h Street , Suite 1500 
New York , N. Y. 10022 
Thailand 
Permanent Mission of Thailand to the U. N. 
20 East 82nd Street 
New York , N. Y. 10028 
Toeo 
Permanent Mission of Togo to the U. N. 
800 Second Avenue 
New York , N.Y. 10017 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Consulate General of Trinidad and Tobago 
420 Lexington Avenue , Suite 333 
New York , N.Y. 10017 
Tunisia 
Embassy of Tunisia 
2408 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. 
Washington , D. C. 20008 
*Name changed as of 30 November 1970 
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Turkey 
Turkish Information Office 
500 Fifth Avenue, Room 5810 
New York, N. Y. 10036 
Uganda 
Permanent Mission of Uganda to the U. N. 
801 Second Avenue 
New York, N. Y. 10017 
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic 
See Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
Permanent Mission of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
to the U. N. 
136 East 67th Street 
New York , N. Y. 10021 
Arab Republic of Egypt 
Permanent Mission of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the U. N. 
36 East 67th Street 
New York, N. Y. 10021 
United Kingdom 
Briti sh Information Services 
845 Third Avenue 
New York , N. Y. 10022 
United Republic of Tanzania 
Permanent Mission of the United Republic of Tanzania 
to the U. N. 
800 Second Avenue 
New York , N. Y. 10011 
United States 
Department of State 
Public Services Divis ion 
\·lashing ton , D. C. 20520 
Upper Volta 
Permanent :Mission of the Republic of Upper Volta to 
the U. N. 
866 2nd Avenue, 6th Floor 
New York, N. Y. 10017 
Uruguay 
Consulate General of Uruguay 
17 Battery Place 
New York, N.Y. 10004 
Venezuela 
Information Office 
Embassy of Venezuela 
241+5 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W. 
Washington, D. C. 20008 
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Yemen 
Permanent Mission of the Yemen Arab Republic to the U. N. 
211 East 43rd Street, 19th Floor 
New York , N. Y. 10017 
Yugoslavia 
Yugoslav Information 
488 Madison Avenue 
New York, N. Y. 10022 
Zambia 
Information Officer 
Center 
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Zambia to the U. N. 
150 East 58th Street, 39th ~loor 
New York, N. Y. 10022 
ACCREDITED OBSERVT~~S NON- MEMBER STATES 
I NFORMATION SERVICES 
Germany (Federal Republic) 
German Information Center 
410 Park Avenue , 11th Floor 
New York, N. Y. 10022 
Holy See 
Office of the Permanent Observer of the Holy See t o 
the U. N. 
323 East 47th Street 
New York , N. Y. 10017 
Korea 
Office of the Permanent Observer of the Republic of 
Korea to the U. N. 
866 United Nations Plaza, Rm . 540 
New York, N.Y. 10017 
Monaco 
Monaco Information Center 
610 Fifth Avenue 
New York, N.Y. 10020 
Switzerland 
Consulate General of Switzerland 
444 Madison Avenue 
New York, N.Y. 10022 
Viet- Nam 
Office of the Permanent Observer of Viet- Nam to the U. N. 
866 United Nations Plaza, 5th Floor 
New York, N.Y. 10017 
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Department of State 
Public Services Division 
1·vashington , D .c . 20520 
Dear Sir : 
420 w. Pier ce St . 
Charleston , Ill . 61920 
Sept . 17 , 1971 
I am a graduate student at Eastern Illinois University and , 
at present , I am working on my thesis . Since my thes is 
deals with Mr . Adla i E. Stevenson ' s speeches to the U. N. 
during the Cuban missile crises it is imperative that I 
obtain copies of the seventeen speec ~ es w~ich he delivered 
to the U. N. dealing with this matter . 
Though I would like to have all of the sevent een crises 
speeches it is actually only necessary for me to have t he 
speeches w~ich Mr . Stevenson delivered to the security 
council at the U. H. There are seven of these s peeches in 
all and he delivered them on the following dates : Nov . 22 
and 28 , 1961, March 15, 16 , and 23 , 1962 , and Oct . 23 , 1962 , 
and Oct . 25 , 1962 . To complete my r esearch I need all 
of the seven speeches delivered t o the security council 
with the exception of the one he delivered on Oct . 23, 1962. 
When I wrote to the Uni ted Nations Archives they dir ected 
me to your office and thought perhaps you might be able 
to help me acquire either all of the Cuban mi ssile crises 
speeches or , i f not all , then only the six which I need 
as specified above . 
If you are unable to supply the information perhaps you 
could direct me to the proper channel . Thank you very 
much for any help you can offer . 
s;11.cerely, 
• 
Jeanne F . J ones 
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
Washington, O.C. 20520 
October 12, 1971 
Dear Mrs . Jones: 
The Department of State has received your letter of 
September 17 requesting copies of seven speeches concerning the 
Cuban missile crisis made by Ambassador Adlai Stevenson in the 
United Nations Security Council on November ~2 and 28, 1961, 
March 15, 16, and 23, 1962, and October 23 and 25, 1962. 
The statements of March 15 and of October 23 and 25, 1962 
have been printed in the Department of State Bulletin, April 23, 
1962, pages 684- 691, and November 12, 1962, pages 723-740. 
Copies of the Bulletin are presumably available in the larger 
public and university libaries in Illinois, or obtai nable 
through interlibrary loan, and you are free to copy part or all 
of the statements . 
I am enclosing copies of the other speeches . 
Sincerely yours , 
Enclosures: 
4 statements made 
by Stevenson. 
Mrs . Jeanne F. Jones, 
Edwin S. Costrell 
Chief, Historical Studies Divisio~ 
Historical Office 
420 West Pierce Street, 
Charleston, Illinois . 61920 
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Library Director 
Princeton University 
Princeton , N. J . 
Dear Sir : 
420 W. Pierce St . 
Charleston, Ill . 61920 
Sept . 17, 1971 
I 
I am a graduate student at F.astern Illinois University and, 
at pr esent , I am working on my thesis . Since my thes i s 
deals with Mr . Adlai E. Stevenson ' s speeches t o the U. N. 
during the Cuban missile crises it is imperative that I 
obtain copies of the seventeen speeches which he deliver ed 
to the U. N. dealing with this matter . 
In my res earch I have been unable to find copies of the 
seventeen speeches and was wondering if you could supply 
texts of Mr . Stevenson ' s Cuban missile crises speeches to 
me . If you could s end all of the s peeches it would be 
mos t helpful to me in my research as I could get a bet ter 
perspective on the entire crises . However, if it is im-
possible to send all of them perhaps you have the seven 
speeches which Mr . Stevenson delivered to the security 
council dealing with the Cuban cr i ses . These seven s peeches 
are urgently needed and I would indeed appreciate it if 
you could either s end me these or perhaps direct me t o 
the proper channel . 
I would be glad to send payment f or making copies of t he 
speeches or if necessar y to send payment f or copies of 
Mr . Stevenson ' s speeches which are contained on micro- film. 
Thank you very much for any help which you a r e able t o 
give . 
Jeanne F . J ones 
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P RI NCETON U NI VE R SI TY L I BR A R Y 
P RI NCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540 
EARLE E. COLEMAN 
fssistant University .J::.ibrarian 
for 'J?..are Books & Special Collections 
Mrs . Jeanne F . Jones 
September 22, 1971 
420 West Pierce Street 
Charleston, Illinois 61920 
Dear Mrs . Jones : 
Thank you for your letter of September 17 in which 
you request access to materials in the Adlai E . Stevenson 
Papers . Unfortunately, I am extremely sorry to inform 
you that the Stevenson Papers at Princeton have not yet 
been made accessible to readers . If you so indicate , 
I would be very glad to notify you as soon as readers 
are permitted access to the papers and we are hopeful 
that this may be near the end of the year 1971 . 
In the meantime, I suggest that you try to locate 
the speeches you mentioned in the New York Ti mes or 
if this source fails it i s quite possible that the 
United States Mission to the United Nations may have a 
file of speeches to which you could be permitted access . 
I sincerely hope you are successful in locating the 
materials you require and again express my regret that 
we are not in a position to assist you at thi s time . 
Nan~y 'Bress}r€r 
Assistant Curator of Manuscripts 
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420 W. Pierce Street 
Charleston, Illinois 61920 
September 13, 1971 
Superintendent of Public Documents 
Government Printing Office 
Washington, D. C. 20402 
Dear Sir : 
I am a graduate student at Eastern Illinois Universit y 
and am presently doing research to complete my master ' s 
thesis . I am writing my thesis on Adlai R. Stevenson 
and find it necessary to obtain copies of the speeches he 
delivered to the United Nations during the Cuban missile 
crises. If you could, send all of the speeches which he 
delivered dealing with the Cuban missile crises or any 
part of them I would be indeed grateful . If you do not 
have some of the speeches perhaps you could direct me to 
some other source . 
Thank you very much for any help which you are able to 
give . 
Sincerelv , 
Jeanne F . Jones 
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
PUBLIC DOCUM~EPARTMENT 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20402 
Thank you for your inquiry which we are returning with one or 
more price lists in the general area of interest i ndicated in 
your letter. 
We regret the delay occasioned 
of orders. Price lists, such 
especially prepared to provide 
to publications we hope will be 
by an extremely heavy influx 
as those enclosed, have been 
with minimum delay references 
helpful. 
In your reply please use the order blank on the reverse of 
this letter. Be sure to fill out the heading and the mailing 
label. List both the titles and catalog numbers of desired 
publications from the price lists. Include your remittance 
by check or money order, payable to the Superintendent of 
Documents (cash at sender's risk), or special coupons , each 
having a face value of five cents and sold in sets of 20 for 
$1.00 . 
If you do not find in the lists any publications that would 
appear to meet your need, it may be possible that the Refer-
ence or Documents Librarian at your local library could help 
you. 
Please let me know if we can be of further assistance. 
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ROBERT E. KLI NG, l ,ru 
Superintendent of 
Dr . Michael Prosser 
State University of New York 
Buffalo , N. Y. 
Dear Si r : 
420 w. Pierce 
Charleston, Ill~ 61920 
September 13 , 1971 
I am a graduate student at Eastern Illinois University 
and, at present, I am working on my thesis. Since my 
thesis deals with Mr . Adlai E. Stevenson ' s speeches to 
the United Nations during the Cuban missile crises it is 
imperative that I obtain copies of the seventeen speeches 
which he delive r ed to the U. N. dealing with this matter . 
I am aware of the fact that you did extensive research on 
this matter in order to complete your doctoral degree at 
the University of Illinois and, I was wondering if perhaps 
you could supply me with all of the seventeen speeches or 
at least some of them . Though I would like to read all 
of Mr . Stevenson ' s speeches dealing with the Cuban mi ssil e 
crises in order to obtain a clear insight into the 
background of the problem, I am especially interested in only 
the seven s peeches delivered by Mr . Stevenson to the 
security council of the U. N. between Nov. 22 , 1961 and 
Oct . 25, 1962 . 
If you could supply this much needed information to me I 
would be most grateful . If , on the other hand you do no t 
have all or any of the seventeen speec hes perhaps you could 
direct me to the proper source . 
Thank you very much. 
Sincerely, 
Jeanne F . Jones 
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I ND IA NA UN I VERS ITY 
D 1'f1nrf11•n1/ of S/11·1 r!t n11d 'J'ft <'nlrr 
Tlll .ATRI: 111 ' 11. 111 :-:C 
111.00:-11:-;c;To:-> . 1:->1> 1.'" ·' -1 ; -1 01 
Dear Miss Jones, 
TEI •. :-;(), 8 1 2-~3 7-6388 
Michael H. Prosser 
September 18 , 1971 
Naturally , I am pleased to hear when yet another person undertakes 
a thesis on the speeches of Adlai Stevenson~ Thank you for your letter. 
May I suggest as a usuful source , my edition An Ethic for Survival : Adlai 
Stevenson Sleaks on Interna tional Affairs , 193-1965 (New t 0 rk: William 
Morrow Co, 969) ,-S-70pp . ~~11 . 95 whi ch may be availa'ble in your library 
or can be ordered from your local bookstore or directly from the publisher. 
It includes a bibliography \hich has all the theses and dissertations , plus 
materials by Stevenson and about Stevenson, which were completed upto 
the spring of 1968 . Two of his speeches about the Cuban Missille Cri si s 
are included there , and the names of all of his other speeches on that 
crisis are listed. Most can be found directly in Department of State 
Bulletins from that general period , usually about two weeks after the 
speech was given. Al so , Champaign- Urbana has a d.epository of the United 
Nations do cuments a t the University of Illinois Library and whatever 
documents are not included in the Department of State Bulletin (which 
are fairly numerous) and which include the correspondence between Kenne~y 
and Khrushehev , should be tlere . Additionally , speeches made by Zorin 
in the United Nations are included in the United Nations deposi tory l ibrary. 
In the event that Champaign is farther than Bloomington, Indiana , our 
Library also has a depository library and would have all of the pertinent 
United Nat ions documents and speeches relating to the event . Unfortunately, 
I no longer have copies of all of the speeches . 
You should be aware that he gav e a whole set of speeches in the 
United Nations related to the Cuban Complaint (which led f irst to the 
Bay of Pi gs) and which thus were related to the later Cuban Missile Crisis . 
They are as follows : Statements to the First Committee on the Cuban Com-
plaint , April 15 ( two statements) , April 17 , April 18 (two s t atements) 
April 20 , 19~1 , a statement i n the G neral Committee on the Cuban item, 
September 21 , 1961 , a statement in tlie General Assembly in reply to the 
stat ement of the Cuban Representative, Oco ober 10 , 19~1 , a statement in 
the Security Council on the Cuban complaint , November 22 , 19~1 , a statement 
in the Securit y Council on the Cuban complaint , Nov ember 28 , 1961, a 
statement in Committee I on the Cuban Complain§ , Febrary 5, 1962, s t atement 
in the Security cOuncil on the Cuban Complaint , March 15 and 16, 1962, 
again on March 23' 1962 , a Poi nt of order ( and later press release) after 
the address by Preside~t Dorticos of Cuba , October 8 , 1962 , a letter and 
~~~~*~~!~~~~ resolution presented to the President of the Security Council 
on Cuba, October 22 , 1962 , a statement in the Security Council on Cuba , 
October 23 , 1962 , a statement to the pres s on Cuba after Security Council 
adjourned , October 23 , 1962 , a statement (actually t wo) on Cuba in the 
Security Council , October 25 , 1962 , the text of a letter to U Thant , · 
transmitting the text of the Whiee House statement on Ballistic Missile 
Build-up in Cuba , October 26 , 1962. Most of these ought to b~ available 
in the State Department Bulletin. Let me lalow if I can help further. 
I wish you luck and hope that you wil=l. s.enli mP nostcard when the 
thesis is finished . C£rdially , ' Michael H. Prosser 
, '"'IC 
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